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INTRODUCTION 
The long-term growth of this country's economy is directly 
1 inked to the aval !able pool of long-term loanable funds. In recent 
years, new productive faci ~ities have been financed to an increasing 
extent through current depreciation and other capital charges allowable 
as income tax deductions. At the same time, for every dol Jar of 
dividends paid out, an approx imately equal amount of earnings has been 
retained for investment in plant and equipment. These two internal 
sources of long-term funds, important as they are, nevertheless fa i I to 
full y supply Industry and commerce with long-term capital. The funds 
corporations cannot save themselves must come from savings made avai !able 
externally . These savings originate prlmari ly with individuals, but are 
offered In the money markets largely through intermediaries -- banks, 
insurance companies, and others. The co rporation desiring either equity 
or c reditor funds with which to finan ce new or replacement instal lations 
must depend chiefly on financial institutions. 
Institutionalized sav ings are s ti II more impo rtant to another 
major segment of the economy: ownership of non-industrial real estate. 
Few individuals or commercial enterprises can afford to purcha~e land o r 
improvements thereon entirely out of their own savings. The mortgages 
they negot ia te are held, exclu~i ve of federal agencies, principally by 
financial institutions. 
lt becomes obvious that financial institutions dominate the 
s uppl y p icture in the private economy's two major areas of long-term 
capital demand. The institutional picture, in turn , Is dominated by the 
I ife insurance companies. Commercial banks carry more assets, but their 
Page 7 
loans are essentially of a short-term nature, despite the recent growth 
of term loans. Loans and investments of I ite insurance companies in 1955 
amounted to roughly $5.7 bi I I ion. The figure tor mutual savings banks 
·and trusteed pension funds (not in c luding those administered by insurance 
companies or government bodi es) was approximately two bi I I ion dol \ars 
apiece, and tor tire, casualty, and marine insurance companies was about 
$ 1.3 bi I I ion. The rapid growth of savings and loans associations re -
suited, in 1955, in loans and investments by these institutions approx i-
mately equal I ing the I ite insurance companies' total of $5.7 bi I I ion. * 
In terms of total debt and other assets held, however , the savings and 
loan associations are overshadowed by the I ite insurance compan ies, which, 
as a group, are the largest single depository of the country's savings.** 
These reI at ionsh ips may be seen graph i ca I I y in Chart no. I. 
In occupying s uch a prominent position in the long-term money 
market, I ife insurance companies through their investment policies neces-
sari ly exert considerable influence on this market and on the entire 
economy. It follows that analysts of these policies is almost certain to 
uncover a wide variety of interesting topics. Accordingly, this paper is 
devoted to such a study. 
A tremendous amount of researc h effort has already been focussed 
on this subject and the field is exceedingly broad. In order to I imit the 
scope of this paper t o an area which one person might reasonab ly hope to 
cover within thesis requirements, an earlier st ud y was selected as a sort 
of benchmark or starting point. The study referred to was made by the 
*55, pp. 8 1 and 82. 
**58' p. 35. 
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Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in 1948-49 and summarized in the Bank 1 s 
November, 1949 Monthly Review, under the title, 11 Broader Investment 
Channels for Life Insurance Companies. 11 In a general sense, the purpose 
of this paper is to bring that study up to date with regard to New England 
companies. It might be assumed that certain peculiarities o f investment 
procedure were thus being ascribed to the New England companies. Nothing 
of this sort is intended; the choice of the New England companies was 
simply a matter of expediency. 
Twenty-one legal reserve I ife insurance companies write busi-
ness in New England. The eight largest of these in 1954 held approxi-
matel y ninety percent of the total assets of all New England I lte 
companies. These eight were selected as a sample on which to base a 
survey of the New England companies not only on the basis of their pro-
portion of total assets, but also because they a! I tal I within the I imits 
of a genera I I y-accepted definition of a 11 I arge 11 I i fe insurance company. 
Inasmuch as investment pol icy of large and smal I I ife companies of 
necessity varies widely in some respects, this point is of importance 
In providing comparabi I ity In the results obtained from interviewi~g the 
companies. 
A final I imitation upon the scope of this paper was written 
into the quest ions asked In the survey. Instead of sing I ing out one 
segment of the I ife companies 1 portfolio for intensive examination, a 
group of questions relating to topics of current interest was formulated 
for each part of the portfolio except pol icy loans and cash. Beyond this, 
three sections of the questionnaire covered matters not specifically per-
taining to any one portion of the portfolio. The principal sections of 
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the questionnaire are enumerated below. This last limitation, then, 
consisted of skimming the surface of investment pol icy matters with a 
view toward bringing to I ight current developments and trends in parti-
cular. At the same time, an effort was made to deal only with pure pol icy , 
i.e., the thinking of investment officers. Extensive statisti cs on I ife 
insurance company investments are continuously being campi led by government 
agencies · and by such trade associations as The Life Insurance Association 
of America, and it was feft that no useful purpose could be served by one 
individual's attempts at burrowing into the great mass of statistics on 
investments kept by I ife companies. 
Briefly, the background of the approach to this paper is as 
follows: Mr. Parker Wi I I is of the Financial Research Division of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston gave very generously of his t ime in out-
1 ining the potential problems involved and suggesting methods of attack. 
Among these suggestions was a trip to New York to talk with members of 
the investment research section of the Life Insurance Association of 
America. An afternoon was spent with Dr. Orson Hart of this organization. 
Dr. Hart was able to shed a good deal of additional I ight on the subject, 
and, in addition, provided names of top investment officers of alI the 
companies for contact purposes. Between this time and the t ime these 
officers were reached to make appointments for interviews, t he material 
contained in the bib! iography was reviewed and a questionnaire containing 
si xty-odd questions was constructed. This questionnaire is shown follow-
ing the conclusion of this paper. The questions were grouped under the 
following headings: (I) direct placements, (2) variable annuities, (3) 
real estate ownership, (4) mortgages, (5) industrial bonds, (6) rai I road 
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and uti I ity bonds, (7) government and munic ipal bonds, and (8) a miscel-
laneous section overlapping a! I portions of the port folio. No interview-
ing was done by mai I; after the initial contact with each company had 
been made to set the interview date, the questiqns were presented on a 
person-to-person basis to one or more investment officers or security 
anal ysts on a pol icy-making level. The names of the companies involved 
and the men interviewed are I isted in Table I. 
Quest ions bearing on the attitude of investment managers toward 
New England borrowers were inserted in all but two sections of the survey, 
in the hope of turning up information of interest to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston. Unfortunatel y, the results here were largel y inconclusi ve . 
They wi I I be discussed only briefly in the appropriate sections. 
Throughout this paper an effort is made to refrain from identi-
f y ing individual companies with the statements made. With one or two ex-
cept ions, the men interviewed were most cooperative both in giving their 
time and in answering alI questions as directly as possible. The general 
pol icy of most I ife in s urance companies apparently is to have practioal ly 
no secrets regarding investments. The possibl I ity remains, however, that 
it might prove embarrassing to one or more of the companies concerne• to 
have its name directly associated with the facts presented. In view of 
the courtesy shown by these companies in making avai !able the time of 
their top investment officers, this precaution seems no more than fair. 
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Table 1: OFFICERS AND ANALYSTS JNTERVIEWED 
New England Mutual Life Insuran ce Company 
Sherwin C. Badger, Financial Vice-President, Securities 
Henry J. Bourneuf, Asst. Treasurer 
Howard Wi 1 Iiams, Security Analyst 
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 
Lee P. Stack, Vice-President 
Dr. Bishop C. Hunt, Vice-President and Economist 
John Adams, Asst. Treasu rer 
Arthur Worthley, Security Analyst 
**Mr. Bosworth, Security Analyst 
**Mr. Sebring, Mortgage Officer 
Massac husetts Mutual Life Insurance Compa ny 
*Homer N. Chapin, Vice-President 
Bert Mount, Vice-President 
Mott A. Garlock, Director of Investment Research 
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company 
Irving G. Bjork, Vice-President 
AI lerton C. Hickmott, Vice-President 
Wi I I iam Griffin, Security Analyst 
**Mr. Barber, Security Analyst 
*Correspondence only. 
** First names not avai !able-- not found in comp an y's annual report 
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Table 1: OFFICERS AND ANALYSTS INTERVIEWED (continued) 
The Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company 
Frederick J. Eberle, VIce-President in charge of mortage loans 
H. Martin Tenney, Vice-President, Investments 
Gay~ord C. Weir, Financial Secretary 
Frank M. Br~stow, Jr., Asst. Actuary 
Aetna Life Insurance Company 
James G. Butler, Secretary, Investment Dept. 
*James H. Brewster, Jr., Vice-President and Treasurer 
Clarence L. Prickett, Asst. Manager, Mortgage Loan Dept . 
The Travelers Insurance Compan y 
Daniel W. Duffield, 2nd Vice-President 
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company 
Lyndes B. Stone, Vice-Ptesident 
H. Archer Clark, Secretary 
**Mr. Mosley, Security Analyst 
*Correspondence only. 
**First names not avai !able-- not found in company's annual report 
I. PRIVATE PLACEMENTS 
A. Background 
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The private placement is commonl y referred to by another similar 
term, direct placement, and also is often called a "private deal." In 
private placements, borrower and lender work together from the begihning. 
In the opposite of a private placement, that is, a pub! ic issue, the 
borrower designs his bond or note indenture to fit the requirements of 
the market in general, or tries to. The bonds are then distributed in 
the market, generally with the help of an investment banking house, where 
they are purchased by the lender. In all I ike! ihood, this lender wi II 
have had no occasion to deal face to face with the issuer. In the pri-
vate placement, on t he other hand, the borrower arran ges directly with 
one or a small group of lenders for a given sum, and the terms of the 
Joan indenture are worked out by the two parties to fil I only their own 
needs. 
Private p lacements are not exactl y a new development, having 
been used occasionally in the 1930 ' s . It is onl y . in the last ten years, 
however, that they have come to the forefront as a leading cha nnel for 
investment for I ife insurance companies. Two main reasons fo r the rise 
in importance of private placements have been stated by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston as follows: 
"The increased use of the private-placement process is due 
to two underlying causes: the dec! ine in importance of the 
indiv idual investor and concurrent rise o f institutional 
investors, and the dec! ine in the supply of corporate 
securities relative to demand. Insurance companies found 
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it difficult to obtain enough corporate securities to meet 
their increasing needs. Thus, in order to be ab I e to 
assure themselves of suitably sized blocks of new securities, 
man y insurance companies t ook aggressive steps to arrange for 
the direct placement of entire issues privately."* 
A third reason for this aggressive action by insurance companies 
might be mentioned. In !946, the time at which the move toward private 
placements began to gain momentum, Interest rates on long-term debt were 
at historic lows. This, together with the fact that I ife compa ny port-
fa! ios at the time were heavy with low-yielding governmen t bo nd s bo ught 
during the war, resulted in very low over-a! I portfo}io yields. Premium 
rates on I ife insurance policies are calculated in part upon net invest-
ment return, and the low yields of 1946 were not sufficient to carry the 
premiums set on policies which had been sold as much as thirty or forty 
years earlier. Private pl9cements offered a solution to this problem, 
si nce they enabled I ife companies to seek out borrowers who had good 
credit potential, but who were not wei I enough known to be able to finance 
in national security markets except at exorb itantly high costs. 
With the higher interest rates and tighter credit which prevai I 
today, life insurance compaAies need no longer assert themselves so vigor-
ously in order to place loans. The current and expected future boom in 
plant expansion augurs wei I for plentiful investment outlets. Neverthe-
less, the private placement has so fully demonstrated its usefulness as 
to have become accepted as a standard investment mechan~sm by I ife 
* 60' p. 4. 
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companies. For this reason, a good deal of space wi I I be devoted to it 
here. 
B. Survey 
I. Forward Commitments. After a I ife insurance company has 
agreed to lend a given amount of money, a date wi I I be set on which the 
bor rower may draw down his funds. This date may coincide with the date 
on which the insurance company expects to have finished processing the 
loan and be actual !y read y to disburse the money. Again, the forward 
commitment may involve a takedown date some months after the final agree-
ment has been signed and the I ife company is ready to release the funds. 
Finally, the company ma y commit itself to allow the borrovJer to draw down 
funds in installments over a period of time starting either at the agree-
ment date or at some later time. The alternative sequences ma y be out-
I i ned as to I I ows: 
a. Authorization date -- amount of loan determined. 
b. Processing. 
c . Final agreement signed -- funds ready to be 
disbursed. Borrower may draw down entire amount 
on this date, or ma y begin to take down in instal 1-
ments extending over several months. 
d. Period following final agreement signing. Borrower 
may elect to take down in a lump sum, or receive 
funds in instal !ments. 
Steps 11 c 11 and 11 d11 show that any one borrower has four alternatives as to 
how he receives the loan proceeds. Where he does not elect to take the 
entire amount on the final agreement date, the period reaching from this 
date to the day on which the last of the proceeds is disbursed is usual !y 
referred to as the "takedown period." 
AI I companies interviewed reported having a substantial amount 
of forward commitments outstanding. This is attributable to the currently 
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tight long-term money market which forces borrowers to search out funds 
well in advance of the time they wi II be needed, or run the risk of 
finding no wi II ing lenders when the need for capital is actually at hand. 
One company estimated its forward commitment position as being equal to 
three to four months of investible cash; another said that It s commit-
ments averaged $100 mi I I ion. 
Should the borrower choose to draw down the loan proceeds at or 
during some time after the agreement date, he may expect to be charged a 
"commitment fee." In effect, this fee compensates the I ife company for 
holding funds idle or in short-term government bonds after the final 
agreement date. Furthermore, the possibi I ity exists that the borrower 
might "bank" his commitment. If, for example, he has been guaranteed one 
mi II ion dollars at four percent in eight months by a I ife company, this 
may be security enough for a bank to lend him half ami I I ion dol Iars at 
three percent during the eight month interval. No borrower would be apt 
to lengthen his takedown period for this purpose, however, if a fee for 
the extra time is charged by the I lfe company. 
Fees charged by the companies Interviewed were no more than one 
percent, although the trend apparently is upward --again due to tighter 
money. Fees ranging from 1/4 to 1/2%, 1/2 to 3/4%, and 1/2 to 1.% were 
about equally common. With the majority of companies this fee goes into 
effect on the final agreement date; only two companies differed, and both 
usually start charging the fee two to three months after the final agree-
ment date. Two companies admitted wi I I ingness to give some ground during 
negotiation, and sometimes defer starting the fee unti I as long as six 
months after the final agreement date in order to gain some sort of 
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reciprocal concession from the borrower. 
Halt the companies allowed a maximum takedown period of one and 
a halt years. Outside I imits given by the others were two, two and a 
halt, and three years. It is the bel iet of one analyst interviewed that 
there is a trend toward lengthening of takedown periods, and this again 
tits into the picture of tighter money . This same analyst reports that 
his company is now committing on jet aircraft which wil I not be delivered 
unti 1 1960. Needless to say, this represents an extreme position. The 
longer takedown periods are typically associated with construction pro-
jects, where installment takedowns are also common . Construction of a 
new plant ma y require two years or more, with interm ittent payouts to 
materials supp liers , cont ractors, etc. Receiving periodic payments from 
the I ife company ove rcomes the borrower's problem of having a large sum 
of money lying idle for a year o r more. One company refers to the peri-
odic takedown on its constructi on loans as "progress payments.'' This 
term is used to denote loans which specify that the borrower wi I I first 
obtain and apply equity capital to his project before receiving the I ife 
insurance company ' s funds, in order that the company's loan wi I I have an 
equity cushion. 
Overly long forward commitments are avoided by one I ife compa ny 
whic h tries to adhere to what they term "yield averaging." Simi !ar in 
some respects to dol !ar averaging, this concept relates to average pre-
sent and expected future return on private placements. If, for example, 
during the early part of a period of rising yiel ds a I ife company heavily 
commits its future funds, it wi II not be able to take advantage of the 
rise in yields that occurs later. Like dol Jar averaging, this principle 
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involves no prediction of the future behavior of the money market, but is 
aimed at satisfactory long-term performance of the portfolio via consist-
ency in Investment of funds. 
2. Return on Private Placements --A basic characteristic of 
the private placement is that the final deal is a product of negotiation. 
Setting the terms of a pub] ic issue is a one-sided proposition; the 
issuer and his investment banker are free to work out whatever indenture 
provisions they choose. The corporation borrowing directly from a I ife 
insurance company, on the other hand, engages in a considerable amount of 
plain, old-fashioned horse trading. The end result of this give-and-take 
is an agreement which is unique unto its own particular situation. 
Putting it another way, the requirements stipulated and the concessions 
made by the two pqrties result in terms which quite closely fit the cir-
cumstances. Although the fundamental circumstances (type of borrower, 
purpose, amount and duration of Joan, etc.) may be alike in a number of 
private deals, the detai Is vary widely, so that it is most unlikely that 
the terms of any two private placements would bear more than superficial 
resemblance to each otber. 
Emphasis is laid on this point because it bears upon the 
interest rate a I ife company can make stick in a private deal. A higher 
rate can usually be gained only at the loss of another desirable pro-
vision, and whereas one I ife company might try to secure the rate differ-
ential, another in the same circumstances might very wei J not. The compa-
nies surveyed were asked the question, "Do you find there is a fairly 
constant differential between the rate of return you get on private deals 
and what you would expect to get on the same security (and same company) 
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if purchased on the open market?n 
Although alI companies agreed such a differential existed, 
there was difference of opin ion as to whether or not this differential 
was a constant one. Rep! ies ranged from ndefinitely constant 11 through 
nsomet imes consta ntn or 11 fair I y constantn to nnot co nstant at a I 1n, the 
latter category predominating. The amounts by which the companies sa id 
their pr ivate placement rates exceeded rates on comparable pub! ic issues 
varied within reasonably narrow I imits. 1/8 to 1/2 of 1%, 1/3 of 15, and 
1/8 to 1/4 of 1% with 1/8% being more common, were answers received. One 
compa ny expressed the differential as being 15 to 20 basis points on a 
pub! ic yield of 3%, or about three to five percent of the pub! ic y ield 
itself. Two companies sa id merely, na I ittle higher,n while another 
claimed a di fferential of nat least 1/2 of l%.n Sti I I another stated 
that its rates are ge~red to the market pri ce of comparable pub! ic issues 
at the time, and seldom vary from this. One officer mentioned that the 
differential is not as great now as when private placements first began 
to be used on a large scale, but is la rger than it was one or two years 
ago. The company quotin g 1/3 of 1% said the differential was greatest 
for them in 1952, when it reached .94 of 1%. Large borrowers of high 
credit standing were said to give no advantage in return, because of 
their strong bargai n ing position. 
Opinions also differed somewhat as to the reasons for this 
yield differential. One respondent said there was no specific reason, 
and fol luwed this by saying that it depends upon what the borrower thinks 
the advantages of direct placement are worth to him. Another said the 
differential depends upon how anxious his compaRy is to do business and 
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how much the bor rower wants a loan. The laws of supply and demand and 
the fact that the I ife company gives up marketabi I ity were also offered 
as reasons for the higher return in private placements. It was noted 
that as rates go up the differential tends to broaden, as borrowers in 
the higher-risk category have to shop around more. 
The weight of opinion lay with the belief that the y ield differ-
ential was due mainly to the extra effort expended by I ife companies in 
placing loans directly. The companies surveyed displayed a high degree 
of uniformity when questioned as to whether or not private placements re-
quired more effort on their part than purchase of pub! ic issues. Typical 
answers were: "unquest ionab I y more, 11 "a I ot more, 11 "a tremendous amount 
more," and the I ike. It was estimated by one person that private place-
ments required an average of three time as much work by the analyst. The 
average processing time required for direct placements seems to run from 
one and a half to three months, with the latter figure being the more 
common. 
Two princi pal factors were offered as reasons for the extra 
work involved in private placements. Jn the first place, in private 
deals the investment department must often concern itself with much of 
the work the legal department might otherwise do. This is not to say 
that the legal department is rei ieved of alI responsibi I lty, but whereas 
in a pubJ ic issue the indenture would normally be turned over to them for 
examination, leaving the investment department free to pursue normal 
security analysis, In a direct placement the anal ys t must be fami 1 iar 
with indenture requirements in order to set up a deal that is economically 
sound. The second reason given for the extra effort in direct placements 
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was t hat many of them go to smal I, unknown companies. When p lac ing a 
Joan with a large, nationall y-known corporation, the I ife company is 
usual ]y wei I acquainted with the borrower 1 s history and current position 
at the outset. In privately placing a loan directly with a small bo rrow-
er, on the other hand, the I ife insurance company wi I l have to start from 
the ground up in acquainting itself with the f1rm 1 s credit standing. In 
many instances this wil I entail reviewing alI the principal transactions 
of the borrower over the course of seve ral previous years . From this it 
ca n be seen that the added increment in rate sought by most I ife compa-
nies is generally wei I deserved. 
Exhibits I and I I are exact reproductions of forms used by one 
company and are inserted at this point to i I iustrate the complexity of 
analysis found in private deals. Exhibit is used as a check! ist in 
pre! lminary negotiations, and exhibi~ I I is sometimes mailed to appl i-
cants who are "pricing" the I ife companies by mail. Parenthetically, the 
compan y has found that in cases where the applicant is obviously unde-
sirable, exhibit I I often serves effectively as a deterrent to further 
queries. 
3. Participations-- In the "ciassical 11 form of private place-
ment, only two concerns are involved: the borrowing corporation and one 
I ife insurance compa ny. Private placements become progressively less 
private, however, as the size of the loan increases and one or more other 
I ife companies are invited to participate. In this arrangement, the I ife 
company originating the Joan wil I handle a] I negotiations and set the 
indenture terms. Then having determined the proportion of the issue it 
is wil I ing to take up, it wi I I place the remainder in the hands of an 
Exhibit 1: PRIVATE PLACEMENT CHECKLIST 
I . Amount 
2. Rate 
3. Term of loan 
4. Use of proceeds 
5. Form of loan 
6. Rig ht to cal I for trustee (smaller p ieces) 
7. Security for loan 
8 . Principal repayment schedule (fi xed, co ntingent) 
9. Redemption privileges (financially ~on-callable) 
10. Working capital covenant 
I I. Dividend restrictions 
12. Additional debt 
13 . First refusal 
14. Negative pledge 
15. Provision against sale, lease , merger, or consol )dation 
16 . Company investments (including subsidiaries) ' 
17. Bank loans 
18. Leases and rentals 
19. Loans to others 
20. Ownership provision 
21. Salary provision 
22. Financ ial reports 
23. Time schedule 
24. Legal expenses 
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Exhibit 1: PRIVATE PLACEMENT CHECKLIST (continued) 
25 . Subject to Finance Committee 
26 . Other participants 
27 . Expiration date of offer 
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Exhibit I I: PRELIMINARY INFORMATION FOR LOAN APPLICATION 
I. Name and address; place and date of incorporation. 
2. Description of any subsidiaries, thsir activities, and percent of 
ownership. 
3. History and brief description of products manufactured or type of 
business, method of distribution ~nd operation, principal customers. 
4. Description and location of property-- state age of buildings and 
whether owned in tee or leased. 
5. Management and ownership, with age, business experience, length of 
association with company, and salary and other compensation set 
forth. 
6. Competitive position, including names of principal competitors. 
7. Labor relations, Including names of bargaining agents, and record 
of work stoppages. 
8. Research program. 
9. Employee benefits inc luding any group insurance , and/or pension plan. 
10. Amount of loan. 
JJ. Purpose and proposed use of proceeds. 
12. Latest avai !able audited Annual Report, and a record from 1936 to 
date of Sales, Net Income Before Taxes, Net In come After Taxes, 
Depreciat~on, Rental Payments, Dividends. Pro Forma Balance Sheet 
reflecting proposed financing. Copies of Annual Reports to stock-
holders covering the past 10 yea rs. Estimated cash-flow chart for 
next 12 months. 
13. Proposed immediate and long-term capital expenditures. 
14. Banking connections. 
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investment banker. The banker contacts other I ife companies, describes 
the loan, a nd puts together the participatioh group. The originating 
company r~ceives no remuneration for its services, but has the advantage 
of being able to arrange the terms which suit it best. AI I participating 
companies are bound by these ter.ms on a sort of "take-it-or-leave-it" 
basis. 
AI I the companies surveyed expressed comp lete wi I lingness to 
engage in participations. Several said that a majority of their private 
placements were participations, and one indicated that they preferred to 
participate in a I I cases. This company has a sma I I staff of ana I ysts, 
and is happy to have another company do the spadework. AI I the companies 
agreed that in the larger issues (what a I ife company means by "large," 
of course, varies with the size of the company) participation is a 
necessity. This was qualified to be dependent also on the credit offered 
and the I ife compa ny 's cash position at the time. 
Two or three compa nies said that they preferred to work with 
certain companies in pprticipations and not with others. The compa nies 
favored were those whose financial policies and ethics most c lose l y 
corresponded to the company in question. On the other hand, one company 
stated that it makes no difference at alI with whom they cooperate. Most 
of the companies engage from time to time in participations with pension 
funds and commercial banks. Pension funds take an inactive role, i.e., 
do no originating. Commercial banks make a logical partner in deals 
having serial maturities, si nce they can take up the s horter maturities, 
which are unattractive to the I ife companies. Quite often the bank wll I 
act as a "finder" in these loans . Having done business with the borrower 
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for many years, as is frequentl y the case, the bank is wei I equipped to 
offer advice to the borrower on floating a large loan, and to search out 
other prospective lenders. 
Apparently about the only disadvantage to participations is the 
fact that in order to get a piece of a desirable private deal, a company 
may have to accept terms which have some undesirable aspects. This would 
seem to be a relatively minor drawback, however. 
Of interest was the admission by one company that selfishness 
plays a part in decisions as to whether or not another company is invited 
to participate in loans originated by the first. By this was meant onl y 
that in a deal where the credit and rate were exceptionally high and the 
terms advantageous the company would be inclined to keep the loan to it-
self, even though its size would ordinarily dictate participation. A 
better term than "selfishness" here would seem to be "common sense." 
One other case of passing interest was that involving a tiny 
southern I ife insurance company whose share of the total issue was lnfin-
lteslmal. Ordinarl ly no participation group would Include so smal I a 
company, but in this instance the company was on friendly footing with 
the borrower, and on the strength of this friendship had managed to be 
cut in on the deal. 
4. Protective Provisions --One of the most outstanding advan-
tages associated with private placements is the flexibility found in the 
relationship between borrower and lender. 
"Another element of significance in explaining the 
general nature of the terms is the long-run flexibility 
of an agreement negotiated with one or a few investors. 
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The corporate Jssuer may consent, for example, to a cove nant 
in a direct placement which obi igates him to maintain working 
capital at a specified level even though there may be doubt 
as to the corporation's abi I ity to I ive up to thi s restri c-
tion in a serious business recession. When the borrower is 
deal lng with one or a few lenders, he may logicall y expect 
reconsideration of his situation in adverse circumstances, 
leading to a waiver of the breached covenant. When an issue 
has been pub) icly distributed to a large number of investors, 
default on even a minor covenant becomes a formidable con-
tingency. 
"In the same vein the institutional lender in a direct 
placement does not necessaril y contemplate the enforcement 
of his rights should the borrower fai I to I ive up to a minor 
provision in the terms. The circumstance wi I I, however, be 
regarded as a danger signal which may indicate the need for 
an examination of the creditor's financial position in 
order to avoid an infraction of a major covenant."* 
Aside from flexibi I ity per se, the abi I ity of lenders in pri-
vate placements to incorporate into the agreement many protective pro-
visions not commonly found in the indentures of pub] ic issues has given 
impetus to a trend toward unsecured loans. Several officers interviewed 
stated that their companies have found the unsecured note to be a more 
satisfactory instrument than a mortgage bond. Financia l texts often 
* 2, p. 108. 
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stress that earning power gives greater security than a I len on bricks 
and mortar, but the reasoning of the I ife insurance companies Is based 
more on practical considerations. The mortgage indenture is time-
co nsum·ing and expensive to prepare, requires the services of a trustee, 
and may have to be frequently amended as the faci I itles covered by the 
1 len are disc9rded and replaced. A debenture note embodying adequate 
restrictions, it is felt, provides at least as much security while doing 
away with the c umbersomeness of a mortgage bond. Only one company dis-
sented; thei r pol icy is to require a mortgage whenever the borrower lends 
himself to this arrangement, in order to gain a preferred position in the 
event of bankruptcy. 
Most of the companies agreed that restrictions on divide nds in 
many cases were necessary. The usual provision freezes the debtor's past 
surpl us, forcing payment of dividends only out of current earnings. It 
is sometimes further stipulated that dividends may not exceed a certain 
percent of net earnings after sinking fund requirements have been met. 
One company prohibits dividend payments when working cap ital is equal to 
les s than 1.25 to 1.75 times total long-term debt, depending upon the 
circumstances. 
Some sort of a s inking fund is also considered a "must" by most 
of the companies. Two companies reported that a 100% payout (retirement) 
by maturity is often cal led for In the case of industrial borrowers. The 
contingent sinking fund has come into general use where the debtor is in 
a eye ! ical industry or has a relatively weak finan cia l position. Under 
this arrangement a minimum sinking fund contributlon is determined and 
payments over and above this must be made whenever the co rporat ion's 
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earnings exceed a given figure. The extra retirements would probably be 
set as a percentage of the excess earnings, and there may be an upper 
1 imit on these payments. Paradoxically, although the contingent s inking 
fund is often forced on the weaker corporations, the very strong credits 
often request it. In this case, the contingent sink ing fund is regarded 
by the borrower as being analogous to the prepayment privilege in a home 
mortgage. Whether or not the I lfe insurance company grants this request 
is a matter of individual company pol icy . While several of the companies 
said that they frequently allow this, one company se ldom if ever does, on 
the theory that they benefit by keeping good money outstand ing as long as 
possib le. 
Provisions as to the level of worki ng capital are generally 
uti I ized in situations wh ich permit calculat ion of a reasonable figure. 
The nature of the borrower's business, of course, governs the ratio es-
tablished, and this ratio differs widely among different industries and 
companies. In the case of a retai I concern which finan ces its invento ry 
through loca l banks, there would probably be no working capital provi-
sion. One company stated that their working capita l requirements run 
from one to one-and-one-half times total long-term debt, witha l Jowance 
made tor debt reduction via the sinking fund. 
Restrictions on mergers and forma tion of subsid iaries are often 
imposed. Approval by the I ife company of merger plans is required in 
order to forestal I the lender 1 s being frozen out of the new corporation 
by legal technicalities regarding responsibl lity for debt. Control is 
exercised over the formation of subsidiaries not to the extent of pro-
hibiting them altogether, but only requiring approval in order to prevent 
Page 31 
the spawning of subsidiaries engaged in a I ine of business entirel y 
foreign to that of the borrower's. Also taken into consideration is the 
possibi I ity that outside interests might set up a subsidiary through 
which to spin off the corporation's property . 
A few miscellaneous provisions occ~sional iy used by the compa-
nies surveyed might be mentioned. The c reation of additional long-term 
debt without prior approval Is usually prohibited. Such a provision 
might read: "Pro forma net tangible assets must equal at least two and 
one half times consolidated funded debt, and pro forma interest charges 
must have been earned at least four times during each of the las t five 
yea rs."* Sometimes a so-called "first refusal" clause is inserted, 
specifying that in the event the borrower desires additional long-term 
funds he w i I I first contact the company which made the or i gina I I oan. If 
the company approves this additional debt but for some reason is not in a 
position to undertake the loan itself, the debtor is free to seek funds 
e I sew here. Such a covenant, however, r s probab I y superf I uous in most 
instances. One of the characteristics distinguishing borrowing through 
private placement from floating an issue in the pub! ic market is the 
rather intimate financial relationship formed between borrower and lender, 
whereby the i ife company becomes thoroughly fami I lar with the debtor's 
c redit standing and is correspondingly more wi I I ing to place further 
loans with him on future occasions, provided his position has not deteri -
orated. By the same token, the borrower is more apt to approach this 
same I ife company for new funds, regardless of a "first refusal" c lause. 
*Cited as an example during class lectures on security anal ysis . 
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In effect, the I ite insurance company becomes the corporation's long-term 
banker, and examples of often-repeated borrowings from the same I ite 
company are plentiful. 
Other protective provisions inc lude restri ctions as to the sale 
or lease of assets without prior approval, restriction of investment in 
assets other than governments, the maintenance of a r easonably large 
equity base tor finance companies, and restrictions on the debts of sub-
sidiaries. 
A great many other protective provisions could be I isted, but 
this discussion has been confined to those which are more important and/ 
or comparatively recent in origin. The loan summary form shown in 
Exhibit Ill contains a number of the provisions discussed above. 
5. Effect of Money Market Conditions-- The companies inter-
viewed were asked the question, "Do money market conditions seem to 
directly affect your operations in private placements?" Rep! ies were 
generally uni l luminating, perhaps because I ite insurance company invest-
ment managers take the money market so much tor granted as to seldom 
closely analyze its effect upon their day-to-day investment decisions. 
Seven of the eight companies surveyed answered this question, and tour 
said either that there was no effect, or that there should be none. One 
officer stated that the principal of averaging, i.e., investing a steady 
flow of funds, was imp I icit in a I ite insurance company's purchase of 
securities through private placement or otherwise, and that fluctuations 
in money rates therefore are of no consequence. A few years earlier this 
man had made a study of conditions in the long-term government bond market 
and had concluded that the then high rates could logically be expected to 
COMPANY 
& ADDRESS: 
OUR RATE: AMOUNT: 
TOTAL PRICE: ISSUE: 
OTHER PARTICIPANTS: 
COMMITMENT TERMS: 
PURPOSE: 
SECURITY: 
TRUSTEE: 
BROUGHT IN BY: 
NEGOTIATED BY: 
INDENTURE PROVISIONS APPROVED BY: 
SPECIAL COUNSEL: 
COMPANY COUNSEL: 
AUDITORS: 
AMORTIZATION: (S.F. Retires: 
) 
REDEMPTION: 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: 
BB3b 
Exhibit Ill 
LOAN SUMMARY 
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TYPE: I DATED: DUE: 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT SIGNED: 1 INT. 
DATE ON WHICH LOAN CLOSED: DATES: 
I COMPANY CONTACT: 
I F. C. MEMO & APPROVAL DATE: 
%) (Average Life: Years) 
Years 
COMPANY-
(page two) 
LIMITATIONS ON ADDITIONAL DEBT: 
No additional debt permitted, other than: 
RESTRICTIONS AS TO PRIOR LIENS: 
DIVIDEND RESTRICTIONS: 
There shall be no stock (cash) payments except: 
MAINTENANCE OF NET WORKING CAPITAL: 
OTHER SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS: 
Per --------------~---~# ---
-,r 
Date -----------------
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drop in the near future. On the strength of this analysis he had gone 
before his company's finance committee with t he recommendation that the 
company borrow money to invest in governments in order to realize the 
cap ita I gains that wou I d be forthcom i·ng with a fa I I in interest rates. 
Not too much t o his surprise, his suggestion was put aside by the com-
mittee on the grounds that a I ife company, in it's fiduciary capacity, 
has no justification for seeking speculative capital gains, and further-
more that the averaging concept made such a course unnecessary. 
A second officer said, "Our company has money to invest all the 
time which has to earn a return and wi I I be Invested regardless of money 
market conditions.'' A third said that the actions of the Federal Reserve 
and the Treasury are only indirect, and that although his company feels 
these actions, the impact is not heavy . A fourth officer rep! ied, "If 
yo u I ike direct placements you should commit a fairly constant percentage 
of your funds in them regardless of interest rates." 
The three companies giving affirmative answers had I lttle to 
add in the way of c~arification. One respondent stated that changes in 
interest rates "cause changes from one channel to another," but did not 
expand upon the point. Another said that rates on their direct placemeAts 
do follow basic long-term rates on a slightly higher level, and a third 
rep! ied that although he thought there was some effect his compan y felt 
it only slightly, s ince their private placements went mostl y to smal 1 
corporations. Two or three companies agreed that in a time of lower 
interest rates and easier money than now prevails, the I ife companies 
might find it necessary to become more active in recruiting borrowers 
than they are at present. 
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6. Warrants -- Life insurance companies are closely regulated 
by state law as to their holdings of common stock, and purchase of equity 
securities occupies a relatively smal I part of the investment departments' 
time. A large volume of policies is sold in New York, necessitating sub-
stantial compl lance with the New York rul~ that no more than 3% of a I ite 
company's portfolio may consist of common stock. ("Substantial" is cur-
rently interpreted to mean not more than 4%.) In light of this it is 
interesting to find that some I ite companies, in their bargaining with 
borrowers, have recently asked tor and received options to buy the debtor's 
common stock as part of the private deal package. In some c~ses both a 
straight senior note and a note convertible into common stock are given. 
One recent private ptacement contained a provision making it possible tor 
the I ife company to take 15% of the principal value of the loan in a 
second corporation's common stock, which had been pledged as col Lateral. 
The horse trading aspect of private placements should be brought to mind 
again at this point. The I ite company that has succeeded in obtaining 
one of these stock options has almost certqinly had to give ground on 
some other point. 
Only two of the companies surveyed seem to be actively inter-
ested in common stock warrants at present. One of these stated that the 
loan must first stand on its own feet, and added that its finance com-
mittee wil I sometimes approve this arrangement when they would not approve 
of purchase of the common stock of the same corporation. The analyst 
interviewed at another company said that his company up unti I now has 
received warrants in only a few private deals, but that he personally 
felt they were a good idea in that they compensate the I ife company for 
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some of the risk involved. He cited the example of the Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority revenue bonds, saying that this project to date has 
been financed entirely by ins~itutions. Since this project, I ike a busi-
ness corporation, is to pay for itself out of the income it generates, and 
since no equity capital has been contributed, the Institutions holding 
these bonds are in a position similar to eq,:ity shareholders, i.e., all 
the risk tal Is upon them. This analyst feels that in situations s imi Jar 
to this, some device such as the surrender of warrants is cal led for so 
that the institutional bondholders may enjoy some of the benefits of 
ownership as wei I as alI of the risks. 
Of the remaining companies, two rep! ied that they never request 
warrants, or do so infrequently. The others seem to be more or less in-
different. One company stated that they believe the inclusion of warrants 
in private placements warps investment judgement, and another that war-
rants lead to loans to poorer credits. It nevertheless sometimes happens 
that a I ife company which cares I itt~ one wa y or the other about warrants 
wi I I have them in its portfolio, simply because of participation in a deal 
put together by another company which has re~uested them. 
Because of the legal restrictions on I ife insurance company 
holdings of common stock, the question is raised as to the disposition of 
the warrants once acquired. Both of the companies most interested in war-
rants agreed that they would seldom be apt to exerc ise them. It was 
pointed out that the company bu ys only blue chip common stocks, and that 
direct placements with a blue chip seldom find the borrowing corporation 
having to give ground on warrants in order to gain some other provision. 
It to! lows that the corporation which would be wi I I ing to give warrants 
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would not be a concern whose common stock the I ife compan y would want to 
hold. Except ions, of course, are possible, and one of the companies 
mentioned that it did have warrants from one or two corporati ons whose 
common stock is of investment status. In the main, then, warrants are 
usuall y sold rather than exe rcised, with the net effect that the I ife 
company realizes a higher retu r n on its loan (the same interest rate 
applied to the principal amount of the loan less the price received for 
the warrants.) When a convertible debenture is given, it is typi cal ly 
so ld or co nverted to common stock which is immediatel y sold. 
7. The Small Borrower-- The question was asked, "Has it been 
your experience that the direct placement route has made it more feasible 
for yo u to lend to smal I borrowers than would be the case were you re-
stricted to purchase of their obi igations in the open market ?" Five of 
the eight companies surveyed rep! led emphatically in the affirmative. 
The term "smal I borrower" should be defined, and can be approx imated, as 
being a co rporation desirous of borrowing somewhere between $350,000 and 
$I, 000,000. What a I i fe company considers to be a "sma I I" I oan varies 
directly in proportion to the size of the I ife company concerned, but 
should tal I within this range for the companies surveyed. 
The five affirming companies stressed the fact that before pri-
vate placements became widely used the smal I, would-be borrower faced 
nearly insurmountable problems in raising funds through pub! ic issues. 
The cost per unit 6t preparing and registering a small pub! lc issue is 
very apt to be prohibitive. Security salesmen often expect a commission 
of fifty do l Iars per bond or more for issues of corporations which have 
I ittle or no recognition in the pub I ic market. Furthermore, the bond 
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indenture of a small Issuer must be expertly designed to offer enough 
protection to investors to be attractive. What one investor might regard 
as satisfactory might wei I be entirely inadequate for another, whereas in 
a private placement the requirements of on ly a handful of buyers need be 
met, and there wil I be no guesswork as to what these requirements are. 
The private placement obviates such expens~s as registration with the 
S.E.C., preparation of prospectuses and other costs of pub! ic distribu-
tion, trustees' fees, printing of bond certificates, and the federal 
documentary stamp tax. In a I I I ike I i hood these savings w i I I be at I east 
partially reflected in a higher interest rate, but the smal I borrower 
must always expect to pay more for money lent him than the larger, less 
risky corporati on. 
One of the most important reasons underlying the I ife insurance 
companies' abi I ity to deal with smal I borrowers in direct p lacements is 
the investigation aspect. In a private deal with a smal I borrower, one 
I ife company in alI probabi I ity wi I I be furnishing the entire loan. This 
means that from a cost standpoint it w II I be pract i ca I for the I i fe 
company to speAd as much time in investigation as is ~eeded to determine 
the soundness of the loan, even though, with a smal ~unknown corporation, 
this may ental I a good deal of expense. If the borrower were financing 
in the open market, the cha nces are that no single I ife company would be 
able to purchase enough of the issue to justify the investigation needed. 
By the same token, the direct placement route makes it practical for a 
I ife company to expend a good deal of time analyzing special situations 
that are either outwardly undesirable or too complex for buyers in pub! ic 
markets to bother with. 
Page 39 
The borrower desiring a "small" loan generally must apply to a 
smaller I ife insurance company for it. Life companies with larger port-
fa! ios can maintain a satisfactory net yield only by keeping down the 
unit cost of putting loans on their books, and several very smal1 loans 
are obviously more expensive to acquire than a single larger investment. 
Down to a certain point, the smaller the I ife company the less able t o 
handle loans of greater size it is, and it is correspondingly more wi I I ing 
to accept smal I applications. The very small life companies (e.g., assets 
of less than $100 million), however, lack sufficient personnel to be able 
to originate direct placements, and cannot afford to commit themselves 
heavily enough in one borrower to be Invited to participate in externally-
originated direct placements. 
The three companies which have found their attitude toward smal I 
borrowers affected I ittle or not at alI by direct placements do not tal I 
into the category of "very smal I" I ife insurance companies by an y means, 
but nevertheless seem to feel that, as one put it, smal I loans are "too 
much work." Despite the attitude of these three, it is read ily apparent 
that the direct placement mechanism is helping to provide a solution to 
one of the currently prominent problems of our economy -- making inter-
mediate- and long-term capital avai !able to the smal I business man. 
8. The New England Borrower-- Indirectl y related to the above 
discussion was the question, "Do yo u find it more expeditious to deal 
with New England enterpr ises in direct placements than with concerns from 
other parts of the country?" As mentioned in the Introduction, this t ype 
of query was included in order to sound out the New England I ife companies' 
attitude toward their neighbors' financial prospects. 
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The matter of the smali borrower enters again here in that one 
company reported that New England borrowers were favored in sma I I I oans, 
the convenience of location dovetailing with the fact that smal I loans 
once made require more follow-up. This company stated, TIWe are more apt 
to ' buy' a smal I loan from New England; otherw ise no special breaks are 
given New England busirqess.TI Two other companies followed this same I ine 
of reasoning in saying that for the most part no preference in their 
direct placements was accorded to New England enterprise, but that the 
convenience of servicing New England loans did offer certain advantages. 
Another company spokesman hedged his answer by saing that whether the 
borrower was located in New England or not made very I ittle difference, 
except for the fact that a major ity of the directors of his compan y were 
New Englanders. These men are a valuable source of fnformation on 
New England credit. In those instances when they do not have the facts 
at their immediate disposal, they are almost certain to know someone who 
can supply the informati on wanted. 
Only one company came out in favor of loaning via private 
placement to New England enterprise. Due to the co nvenience in making 
the original study and in servicing, this compan y is sometimes inc I ined 
to accept slightly less qualit y in a New England investment than it would 
in a loan placed elsewhere. 
Three companies reported that the debtor's location made no 
difference at al t, but that there was no discrimination aga inst New England 
firms. These companies emphasized that they (I ike the others) do business, 
i.e., write policies, on a national scale, and that their duty to their 
policyholders obi igates them to purchase the best investment they can 
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find at any g iven time, regardless of its geographical origin. 
9. Original Initiative --The companies inteviewed were unani-
mous in stating that the initiative in most of their privat e placements 
has been with the borrower. Jn well under twenty percent of alI the 
deals, however, does the borrower approach the I ife compan y directly, in 
practically alI other cases the approach is through some sort of inter-
mediary. Two of these predominate. lhvestment bankers, acting as brokers 
or "finders," bring the bulk of the business in. While rel y ing primarily 
on investment bankers, four of the companies said that commercial ban ks 
were also good sources of new loans (see number 3). 
Both of these sources came in for some criticism, however. One 
company said that although a few of the large investment banking houses 
are prepared to properly handle a direct placement from start to finish , 
with the terms worked out in a complete package, there are many smaller 
houses which don't actuall y contribute a great deal. Time and again, 
where this compan y is the only lender invorved and the borrower returns 
at a later date to negotiate a new loan, the investment banker raises a 
howl of protest because he receives no commission. Since he has often 
provided I ittle in the way of useful services in the original deal and 
nothing whatsoever in the second and succeeding placements, this I ife 
insurance company is understandabl y cool toward his protestations. 
A second company interviewed voiced a disin c lination to do 
business with commercial banks because, in the analyst's words, (!) "They 
usuall y want to hog alI the short maturities, even in the risky situation, 
(2) many times banks take suc h a smal I, short position that the I ife 
company is pul I ing the bank's chestnuts out of the fire, and (3) many 
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times the bank hasn't done the proper spadework and education, which then 
fa lis upon the I i fe company." 
Other sources of loan business for the companies questioned 
include lawyers, ''smal I security men," friends of the company, company 
agents, other insurance companies, and word of mouth. Occasional 1y a 
corporation holding some sort of pol icy with a life insurance company 
wi I J turn first to that company for a loan on the premise that one good 
turn deserves another. 
Financial texts pub! ished circa 1948-1952 sometimes state the 
proportion of direct placements brought in to I ife companies by intermed-
iaries as being around 50%. This ma y wei I have been true a few years 
earlier, but again the continuing relation between borrower and lender in 
private placements asserts itself. Whereas this figure may be approx i-
mately correct for new busihess, the percentage for £11 loans directly 
placed is considerably smaller. In each succeeding year there are more 
and more corporations which have established credit with i ife insurance 
companies and which, as they grow and prosper, return again and again to 
borrow anew without benefit of any intermediary. The process tends to be 
a cumulative one, so that the extent to which life companies must depend 
upon middlemen ~onstantl y decreases at an increasing rate. 
I 0. 0 is pos i ng . Q.f. Private P 1 acements -- J t is sometimes a I l eged 
that one of the disadvantages to I ife insurance companies of direct 
placements is the sacrifice of marketabi 1 ity in the issue purchased. The 
fact that loans are more often made to smal 1 companies through private 
deals than through pub! ic Issues was mentioned earlier, and it is un-
deniably more difficult to market the debt of a small concern than that 
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of a large, nationally-recognized co rporation. Beyo nd this, however, the 
companies surveyed did not unanimously support the contention that direct-
ly placed loans suffer loss of marketabi I ity. 
Dogmatic conclusions in this area are difficult to arrive at, 
because experience in sale of private placements is very I imited. Life 
insurance companies, almost without exception, are accustomed to a con-
tinually positive net cash flow (more on this in a later section.) As a 
result, for all practical purposes they never have to sel I s ec urities to 
realize cash. Although any I ife company would want to unload a loan 
which had turned out poorly, it is only logical to expect t hat an y pro-
spective purchaser would investigate before committing himself, and that 
his of fer would be worth I ittle more to the I ife company than the loan 
itself. 
This situation is reflected in the fact that only one out of 
the eight companies has sold enough pr ivate p lacements to be able to say 
without reservation that they have experienced no difficulties in sel I ing 
thus far. This same company, however, said that although they have seen 
good markets develop for some privately placed issues, they would assume 
they might wei I have trouble in future sales, since the onl y real buyers 
wou ld be other · Institutions. This brings up the problem of I iquidity in 
general, which is dealt with in section VI. 
Four compa ni es stated that they have never tried to sel I any 
direct placements whatsoever, except to help the borrower meet sink ing 
fund or cal I provisions. One said that since it is their pol icy toes-
tablish the best relations possible with their debtors, they would sel I 
a private placement only when the credit was deteriorating or the manage-
Page 44 
ment was acting unwisely. A second did say that although they had sold 
no private placements, they would expect them to be less marketable than 
issues acquired pub! icl y . 
The three remaining companies have sold direct placements only 
on rare occasions, and a! 1 three said that no particular obstacles were 
encountered. One issue of one company was sticky, but evidently these 
companies for the most part had sold wei !-known credits, and the sales 
were quite satisfactory. 
From the foregoing it can be seen that on the basis of this 
samp ling, at least, no firm conclusions can be reached as to the market-
abi I ity of privatel y placed securities. It might be mentioned that regis-
tration with the S.E.C., poses no particular problem. Present r ulings of 
that agency indicate that if the intent of the purchasing institution was 
to hold the securities rather than to rese l I them, i.e., not to act as an 
investment banker, registration upon resale is not required. The intent 
of the parties concerned is determined by the length of time the securi-
ties are held prior to resale, and, although apparently no unequivocal 
statement as to what constitutes a proper waiting period ex ists, three or 
four months is probably sufficient. Realizing the uncertainties inherent 
in bureaucratic dicta, the I ife insurance companies in man y of the large 
participating deals have inserted covenants to the effect that the 
borrower wi I I register the securities and draw up an indenture suitable 
for pub! ic issue in the event that resale becomes necessary or an adverse 
rul iAg is set forth. 
With a view toward double-c hecking the companies on the matter 
of marketabi I ity, the question was . asked, "Do you ever engage in sales of 
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privately-placed securities to or from other I ife insurance companies?" 
Three companies rep I ied that they had never exchanged private placements 
with other I ife companies, although one stated that it would not hesitate 
to do so. A fourth said that they very se ldom engage in such trans-
actions, but that they sometimes sel I securities back to borrowers on a 
sinking fund basis when money rates rise enough so that both parties c an 
split the difference and benefit therefrom. (Example: If the prevai I ing 
rate rose from four to five percent, sinking fund payments co uld be 
accelerated t o retire a substantial portion of the o ld tour's, with 
4-1/2's being issued to the I ife company in place of them. The I ife 
company would be receiving a higher return than formerly, and the borrow-
er would have new funds at less-than-current rates.) 
Three other compan ies occasionally buy or sel I direct place-
ments that come from or go to other I ife companies ultimately, but these 
companies emphasized that the transactions are handled by brokers, l ~e ., 
the sale is not direct to another I ife company, and that it is simp ly 
assumed for the most part that the other party is a I ife company, since 
they provide most of the market. In a few isolated cases personal con-
tact between the companies has proven the point. One company said that 
they have offered to buy second-hand private placements from another I ife 
company but have never actual iy done so. Their finance committee frowns 
upon the practice, believing it bet ter not to h9ve such transactions show 
up on statements . 
I I. Preferred and Common Stock-- The direct placement method 
has proved itself to be of such worth to I ife insurance companies in 
securing debt obi igations that it was thought worthwhile to inquire as to 
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whether or not stocks were being acquired in this way also. Whereas 
three companies reported that they buy stock through private deals either 
very rarely or not at a! I, the other five have alI bought preferred stock 
via private placement. Three of these said that the method works as wei 1 
here as for notes and bonds, two stating that they have obtained excel lent 
rates, and one having secured a conversion feature in one case. A fourth 
said that they generally require heavy sinking funds in privately placed 
preferred issues, and that this rather defeats the purpose of the issuer, 
since the stock is retired so rapidly that a bond issue might wei I serve 
better. 
None of the companies reported ever having bought common stock 
by direct placement. The reason is not too hard to see: with state laws 
I imiting most I ife companies to three or four percent of their portfolio 
in common, individual purchases are necessarl ly_smal I, and would not make 
practical the extended negotiation accompanying a private placement. 
From a cost point of view alone, open market purchase of common stock is 
the only feasible route. 
I I. PUBLICLY ISSUED BONDS 
A. Introductory Notes 
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In the field of pub I icly Issued bonds -those of industrial 
corporations, pub! ic uti I ities, rai I roads, the federal government, and 
state and municipal governments and authorities - are found wei I estab-
1 ished, conventional c hannels of investment for I ife insurance companies . 
Th e thinking and poI i c i es of I i fe companies' investment managers toward 
these channels are so wei I settled in custom and practice as to o ffer 
I ittle ln the way o f new ideas. Accordingly, this area is dealt with 
very superf ic tal ly in this paper. 
Some overlapping is found here. Questions on both private 
placements and attitude toward New England enterprise are included. The 
matter of New England preference takes on a somewhat different aspect in 
regard to pub! icly issued bonds than was the case in direct placements. 
In pub! ic issues, location~! convenience for origination and servicing is 
of much les s significance, and the central point becomes the fundamental 
question of New England's economic matu~ity of possible stagnation. This 
point, incidentally, was well skirted in the replies received. 
Since t h is section was felt to be the least important part of 
the s urvey, the questions therein for the most part were the last to be 
brought up in each interview. Some interviews required so much time be 
spent on the other sections that there was I ittle left tor this one. As 
a result, some companies answered the questions only briefl y or not at 
al 1. With such scattered and fragmentary responses, the material pre-
sented here ca n hardly be said to fairly represent the investment pol icy 
of New England I ife insurance companies in the areas covered, and is 
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offered as being of only passing interest. 
B. Survey 
I. Industrials As mentioned in the introduction, an attempt 
is made in this paper to avoid statistics and concentrate on the thinki ng 
that produces them . However, the question was asked, "What (approx imate) 
propor t ion of your industri .al bonds have you been buying by direct place -
ment during the past five years?" This question and the two li ke i t in 
numbers 2 and 3 be low mi ght we i I have been p laced in the section on pri-
vate p lacements, and were put here only because the pr i vate p lacement 
section wa s a lready re latively large. 
The answers received we r e esti mates rather than precise ca l-
culations derived from books of account, bu t neverthe less point up the 
popularity o f the direct placement device. Five com pan i es responded, a nd 
four o f these gave the percentage of i ndustri a l bonds acqu i red by private 
p lacement as 80% or higher. On e officer guessed the figure for h i s com-
pany to be in the neighborhood of 90%. Another, who said h i s com pa ny 
depends less on direct p lacements than most others, s a id the proportion 
was wei I in excess o f half. 
The ques t ion "Do yo u t end to give preference to obligations of 
New England Jndustrial concerns?" el icited a uniformly noncommi t a l re-
sponse. All companies replyin g (five ) said in effect that they showed no 
discrimination pro or con toward New England lndustrial bo rrowe r s . Three 
companies said that in an "al 1-other-th i ngs-being-equa l" situation they 
mi ght lean a little toward a New England concern, but the po s sibi l ity o f 
such a situation ar i sing is so remote as to be inconsequential. One of 
these thr ee stated that their pr e ference for New England borrowers mi ght 
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be a little stronger than this, since "New England financial ethics tend 
to be better," or more closely akin to this company's. The feeling seems 
to be shared by most New England I ife companies that they are receptive 
to financing New England firms but general !y unwil I ing to show partisan-
ship. Two points discussed ear~ier were brought up by the companies: 
first, that they write business nationally and make their investments on 
the same basis, and second, that convenience of location may sometimes 
Influence a decision slightly in favor of a New England corporation 
( es pee i a I I y in a sma I I d i rect p I acement. ) 
In order to ascertain whether or not the trend toward unsecured 
obi igations found in direct placements was in evidence in purchases of 
pub! ic issues, the companies were asked, "Does the bulk of your present 
industrial portfolio consist of secured or unsecured obi igations?" In 
the over-a! I, national market for industrial bonds there apparently is a 
growing tendency for the larger corporations to issue debe ntures, and 
this was borne out by the rep I ies received. Three out of the four compa-
nies answering said that the bulk of their recentl y-acquired industrials 
is unsecured , although some of the - respondents were a I ittie vague as to 
just what proportion 0f the pub] ic issues were debentures, since most of 
their purchases have been through private placements. Investment in the 
obi igations of sales finance companies has become increasingl y popular 
with I ife insurance companies in the last year or two, and since these 
are for the most part unsecured, they help to swel I the proportion of the 
total portfolio that is unsecured. 
2. Obi igations 2f State and Local Governments-- The direct 
placement is usually thought of as being associated only with loans to 
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industrial corporations. This is not the case, and a I imited number of 
municipals are sold by this method, or a variation of it. It quite often 
happens that the terms of a municipal issue, with the hel p of investment 
bankers, wi I I be tal lored to fit the requirements of a group of insurance 
companies. This helps to insure sale of a large portion of the issue, 
the balance of which is sold pub I icly in the usual way. In any case, 
sale is almost always through an investment banker, whet her to the in-
surance companies or to the investing pub I ic. Strictly speaking, this 
method does not fit the definition of a private placement, but does have 
similar characteristics . The laws of many states prescribe offering 
municipal bonds at competitive bidd ing, but even under these conditions 
a "semi-private" placement sometimes comes about. This may occur when no 
bids are s ubmi tted for the issue and it is then turned over to a group of 
insurance companies or other institutional investors. Regulations vary 
from state to state, and there is no definite pattern in these negotiated 
deals. The two companies providing this information both buy municipals 
in this way; one said that in 1955 it purchased about 80% o f its muni c i-
pals via this method. A third company stated that it bu ys 40% to 50% of 
Its municipals in smal I deals which begin as pub! ic issues but end by 
being sold to a smal I group of I ife compan ies . Another compa ny stated 
that it buys a relatively smal I number of its total municipals through 
direct placements, and only one said that all its municipal purchases are 
made in the open market. 
When asked about their preferences for revenue bonds vs. ful I 
faith and cred it obi igati ons, the companies surveyed were uniformly more 
disposed toward the former. This is largely due to the fact that the tax-
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exempt status of the general obi igations of state and local governments 
has I ittle value to a I ife insurance company. Whereas a municipal 
yielding 2.5% may be attractive to an investor in the 60% bracket, the 
I ife company has I ittle to gain, its effective rate of taxation being 
7.8% of income. Life companies get a creillit against income of 87-1/2% 
on the first $1 ml I I ion, and 85% on the excess. Except for t he smal I 
companies, this means that the 52% corporate rate is appl led to 0nly 15% 
of income, producing the 7.8% effective rate. 
Although some revenue bonds have certain tax-exempt features, 
their yields are uniformly higher than general obi igations. Invest-
ment policies of course vary from company to company, and some are much 
hea.vier buyers of municipals and revenue bonds than others. Whatever 
their inc I inations in this respect, however, a! l the companies inter-
viewed agreed that yield requirements forced them to channel most of 
their funds for this part of the portfolio into revenue bonds. One offi-
cer also mentioned that revenue issues have definite security, which a 
general obi igatlon does not. About the only advantage cited for ful J 
faith and credit obi igations was that they seem usually to be more market-
able than revenue borids. 
The New England area has distinctive characteristics in the 
field of state and local governments' bonds, although this is not, as 
might be supposed, related to the economic maturity, lack of population 
growth, poor tax administration, etc., often attributed to New England. 
Municipal Issues f~om this area suffer rather from their extremely high 
c redit ratings. The history of New England's states' and municipalities' 
abi I lty to meet their debts plus their highly regarded financial ethics 
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has created great demand for their obi igations --particularly outside 
this region-- with the result that yields on these obi igations are about 
the lowest found. Since ful I faith and credit bonds are low-y ielding to 
begin with, the compan.ies surveyed with only one exception practicall y 
never purchase New England 1 s genera l obi igations. Because of their high 
credit, this company does bu y a ce rtain number of bonds issued by states 
and muni c ipalities ln this region, especially those of the state in which 
their home office is located. 
Some of the companies find that Canadian municipal bonds offer 
a better out let for their funds: Canadian bonds are not United States 
tax-exempt, and so have to be offered at a higher y ield to be attractive 
to United States investors. One of the companies interviewed has 46% o f 
its total municipal portfolio in Canadian obi igations. 
3 . Ra i I road and Pub I ic Uti I ity Bonds --The only question asked 
on rai Is and uti I ities had to do with the use of direct placements in 
purchasing these bonds. Evidentl y most of the companies feel that their 
ra i I portfolios are about as large as they can comfortably carr y . Pur-
t hases are infrequent, and one company interviewed is bu y ing no new rai I 
t ends at alI, but Is letting the po rtfolio shrink through ca l Is and re-
tirements. In the I imited experience the companies have had recently in 
l uy ing rai I road bonds, the direct placement route has p la yed only a small 
bart . Two companies reported that alI or nearl y alI o f their co nditi o nal 
f ales contracts were acquired by private negotiation, but a lmost no mort -
~age bonds have been bought in other than the open market. Equipment 
+rust certifi cates were not dis cussed in this connection . 
The uti I ity p icture is a I ittle diff e rent. As with muni c ipals, 
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state law often stiuplates that pub! ic uti I ities offer new securities for 
J ompetitive bidding. Nevertheless, It appears that many smal I uti I ities 
f ith a restricted security market often engage in private placements. 
J hree analysts confirmed this, whereas a fourth stated that his company 
~as bought approx imatel y half its uti I ities by private placement in recent 
r ears, and that there was nothing to suggest that the bulk of these had 
r ome from the smaller companies. This was in direct contrast to the 
statement of another analyst who said that his company also buys 50 to 
, O% ot its uti I ity bonds by direct placement and that most of these pri-
ate deals were definitely with the smaller companies. One other sur-
r eyed company also said that at least half of its uti I ity bonds were 
!ought by direct negotiation with the issuer, and since only five compa-1 ies answered this question it seems possible to assume that direct place-
r ents play a fairly important part in the sale of pub! ic uti I ity issues to I ife companies in this region. Rep! ies received on the question of pri-
r ate placements indicate that this device is used less by electrical com-
anies than by the oi I pipe! ine and natural gas transmission companies. 
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I I I. REAL ESTATE OWNERSHIP 
A. The Present Picture 
Mortgage le nd ing is a long-accepted type of investment by I ife 
insurance companies, and, although s imilar In some respects to actual 
wnership of real estate, should not be confused with it. In both cases 
r he I ife company makes possible occupancy of property by a seco nd party. 
~ n a mortgage operation the I ife company merely advances part of the pur-
chase pri ce on the security of the I ien, whereas an equity investment in 
[ eal estate lmpl les complete ownership of the property by the I ife com-
pany, accompanied by some sort of lease given to the second party. 
I' Ownership of real estate has only recent ly come into general 
l cceptan ce by I ife companies as an investment medium. The experiences of 
r he 1930's , which saw wholesale mortgage foreclosures resulting in owner-
ship of undesirable propertie~ by the I ife companies, led to a hands-off 
~attitude toward real estate that lasted through World War 11. It has 
always been an accepted theory of I ife insurance investment that that in-
estment is best which can be made and then put down in the vault and for-
gotten. In other words, I i fe company investment managers see their job 
las one of making secure investments but not managing them once made. Real 
estate ownership may wei I invol ve management problems, and this is es-
pecial ly true in residential housing such as housing developments or 
apartments, but the multiplicity of lease arrangements now in commo n use 
makes it possible to avoid most o f the worst headaches. 
The growth in real estate ownership is similar to that found in 
private placements in that both represent departures from traditional 
channels of investme-ntstemming from the pressure on I ife companies in the 
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ast ten years to put more funds to work at higher rates of interest. 
lhat efforts in this direction have been successful Is shown by the fact 
~ hat in the period 1945-1955 ownership of real estate by all life insur-
ance companies grew from $857 mi I I Ion to $2.557 bi I I ion, a 202% gain, 
J hi le total holdings rose from $44.797 bi I I ion to $90.219, an increase of 
dnly 102%.* 
A I ife compan y ma y acquire real estate simpl y by bu y ing up a 
, roperty that happens to come to its attention and seems desirable. More 
mften, however, the property is acquired with the future tenant in mind, 
lhrough some transaction such as the now fami I iar sale and lease-back, escribed in the following quote: 
"In basic outline the sale and lease-back is simple ln 
form, although its ramifications ma y become quite complex . A 
business firm requiring addttional working capital sel Is some 
or alI of its land and bui !dings to an insurance compan y, and 
simultaneousl y enters into a lease agreement covering a long 
period of time-- 20 to 30 years as a rule. The lease ma y 
contain options for renewals for periods covering an equall y 
long period, almost invariably at a reduced rental. It less 
frequently contains an option to repurc hase the property at a 
price related to the value at which it is carried on the books 
of the owner. 
"The sale and lease-back is frequently used by a firm as 
a method of securing additional faci I ities in order to expand 
L 62' p. 4 79 
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operations. In such cases the firm may construct new buildings 
and then enter into a sale-lease agreement. Alternatively, on 
the strength of the firm' s commitment to rent the property upon 
completion of bui !dings, an insurance company may undertake the 
construction in accordance with the prospective tenant's plans. 
In either case, the result is the same; the business firm se-
cures additional quarters and the insurance company acquires 
property which is leased for a long term."* 
It is somewhat diffi cult to out I ine in simp I ified form the pros 
and cons of the sale and lease-back. The complexities which arise may be 
I I lustrated by quoting again from the source above, which g ives a very 
good but quite conde nsed summary of the advantages of lease arrangements 
as fo I lows: 
"The seller of the property receives additional worki ng 
capita l, the use of the bui !ding, and at the same time se-
cures income tax benefits through renting rather than owning 
real estate. This practice may be described as an accelera-
tion of deprec iation or the extension of the depreciation 
principle to include land. The advantages are c lear cut when 
the sale-lease transaction is compared with ownership o n the 
assumption that the same amount of funds is obtained through 
a loan which ca l Is for annual payments of interest and 
principal. 
"Under the sale-lease arrangemerrt, payments of rent are 
assumed to be deduct ible as business expenses. Thus the ful I 
*60, p. 3 
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amount of the occupancy costs is taken as an expense before 
taxes. A similar payment in the case o f a loan consists of 
two e I ements, interest and repayment of p r inc i pa I; on I y the 
former is a deductible item. If the firm owned its real 
estate, it could take an additional deduction by deprecia-
ting its bui !dings -- but not the land. These additional 
deductions would not, however, amount to as much ove r the 
period of the loa n as would the repayment of the principal 
during that period. This follows from the fact that they 
would be based upon the charge-off of a smaller amount over 
a longer per iod of time , because the leases are invariab ly 
wrJt~en for a period which is less than the expected eco -
nomi c I ife of the buildings. 
"There are offsets to these advantages, however. First 
and foremost, while the vendor-tenant may have the use of the 
bui !d ings over a long period of time, he has lost ownership 
and must pay rent to continue his occupancy. Second, the 
c harge-e fts from income before taxes -- particularly depreci-
ation -- are compressed into a s horter period of years and 
thus bear heavil y on income during the initial period of the 
lease. Judging by the number of transactions, however, the 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages. 11* 
The foregoing s hould serve to indicate that some serious th Jnk-
ing by both the · prospective lessee and the I ife company must take place 
*60 1 p. 3 
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before a sale and lease-back transaction i~ consummated. 
A great deal more introductory material could be set forth here, 
but, as in other sections of this paper, background comments wi I I be kept 
to a minimum in order to present fully the material gathered in the survey. 
B. Survey 
I. ~of Assets Owned --The companies interviewed were pol led 
as to what kind of real estate they prefer to own. The answers given are 
ro ughl y grouped here by first, second and third choices. 
Five companies gave retai I stores as their first preference and 
major equity investment in real estate. Two of these said that they owned 
an approximately equal amount of modern warehouses, with one company 
specifying that their warehouse ownership ii confined mostl y to manufactur-
ers' distributing warehouses, as contrasted to the pub! ic type. Another 
said that most of its retai I properties are department stores. A s ixth 
company reported that its real estate ownership is concentrated primarily 
in supermarkets, manufacturing properties, and warehouses. A seventh com-
pany is invested most heavily in office bui ]dings. The eighth company was 
not questioned on real estate ownership for reasons given in a later para-
graph. The responses given here seem to pretty wei I bear out Mr. John G. 
Jewett in his statement that "Probably the most desirable investment is 
"* -!-he reta i I store property ..• 
Of the companies that gave their second preference, two said 
that office bui !dings fa! I Into thLs category, with one of these narrowing 
*3, p. 174 
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it down to smal I office but !dings. A third stated that their second 
choice was Industrial property, and that about equally ranked were truck 
terminals. 
Three companies also gave their third choice in investment real 
estate. One said that about 20% of their total real estate holdings is 
in three housing developments (this was the largest interest in housing 
developments reported.) This company also owns a number of apartment 
houses, about half of which are FHA-insured, the other half uninsured. A 
s eco nd company has one housing development and a number of gas stations 
leased to one of the big distributing companies. The third company gave 
as its last choice the store bui !dings It owns, including a shopping 
center. 
This conflicts somewhat with what was said above about the pop-
ularity of retai I outlets as equity investments. In this connection, the 
seven companies pol led on real estate alI listed at least one type which 
they have not bought at all, and two of them placed chain retai I proper-
ties in this category. A retail store under lease to a strong chain is 
considered by many I ife insurance companies to be the soun dest t ype of 
real estate investment, and It would be interesting to know why these two 
companies dissent. Unfortunately, no statement was obtained from either 
as to their thinking In this regard. 
Two companies gave manufacturing properties as a type they have 
never invested in. One company said that they own no hotels or gas sta-
tions, and another avoids multiple occupancy properties altogether. This 
rules out quite a number of real estate Investments, among them housing 
developments, apartment bui !dings, office bui I dings and hotels. The basic 
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reason for shunning the properties given in thls paragraph is a fear of 
being overburdened with problems of management inherent in this kind of 
real estate. As mentioned earlier, the I ife companies much prefer to be 
able to forget an investment once it has been made originally, rather 
than becoming tied up with entrepreneurial decisions. 
Although most of the companies surveyed seem to be following 
the trend toward equity investment i n real estate, two of them have a 
different attitude. One said, "We have never been substantial buye rs of 
real estate, and with the tight money market conditions now prevai I i~g 
we are especially lukewarm." The pol icy of the other company has always 
been to avoid property ownership, their depression experiences with 
defaulted mortgages contributing largely to this feel lng. They presently 
own only two pieces of real estate, both of these being special situa-
tions. One of these illustrates the community spirit found in most I ife 
companies . The c ity in which the home office i s located became badly 
in need of new hotel facilities. The city fathers proposed construction 
of a new, modern hotel .b ui !ding, but evidently ran into trouble in t heir 
financing plans . The city's I ife insurance companies, this one included, 
were approached on the matter, and alI agreed to buy into it . The 
company in question contributed its proportionate share desp ite a deep-
seated bias against such investments. There Is no doubt that they 
wou ld never have considered such an undertaking were it not for their 
awareness of the importance of good pub! ic relations. At the end of 
1955 the real estate equities of this compa ny comprised only . 19 of 1% 
of their total admitted assets and, because of their lack of experience 
in real estate, they were not quest ioned at alI on thi s area of the survey. 
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In order to double-check the foregoing material, the companies 
were asked whether or not they preferred commercial properties to those 
occupied by industrial firms. A good deal of unanimity was displayed 
here, withal I the companies agreeing that commercial properties were 
generally. more desirable. Two companies without prompting s ingled out 
retai I property as being the most sought after of alI. 
In answering this question, a few of the companies elaborated 
as to what arrangement they considered as giving the best investment. 
One company said that it usually seeks retai I stores leased to national 
co ncerns and located in 100% areas. The "100% area" was explained as 
being a city block, or a location on that block, where foot travel and 
pub! ic transportation are so heavy (and bring in so many shoppers) thqt 
a! I other areas are compared to it as being one of the city ' s best. In 
other words, any other area would probably be rated at a figure of less 
than 100%. Three companies said what amounted to about the same thing: 
They prefer wei !-located retai I properties under long-term occupancy by 
good cred its. "Good credits" are often taken to be synonymous with the 
large retai I cha ins such as Woolworth and Kresge but, as noted above, 
two of the companies have I ittle use for chains as tenants. One compan y , 
which said that it was the first in its state to invest in real estate 
equities, made the decision in 1945 to buy only retai I properties with 
long-term leases to strong chains. With the exception of purchases of 
one newspaper bui !ding and one office bui ldlng they have not deviated 
from this rule. Apparently th e ir experience with these two buildings 
has not been such that it has c hanged their minds about the value of 
retai J property. 
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Whe n asked why they preferred commerc ial , and especially retai I 
property, the companies gave a number of advantages associated wit h this 
type of real estate. Perhaps the most important attribute of r etai I 
commercia l property was considered to be its flexibility. It is less 
specialized than man y other types, and consequently has a wider market 
for resale when a tenant vacates or tal Is. In most cases the bui !dings 
are of nominal value compared to the land valuation, which tends to make 
the property more of a permanent investment . Also given as a maj o r 
advantage was the fact that retai I outlets se ldom produce any manage-
ment prob lems for the insurance company. 
Housing developments have in the past aroused a good deal of 
interest in the communities in which they were established, and some of 
the comments of the companies s urveyed on this field ma y be worth repeat-
ing . Ownership of housing developments does not stand high on the larger 
New England companies ' I ists of desirable equities . Only two compa nies 
have entered this field; one has three developments and the other onl y 
one, albeit a large one. The company with three also J ikes a large 
development, and gave a range of from 3.5 to 4.5 mi I I ion dol Iars as 
being a suitable size. They prefer a develo~ment big enough to justify 
c lose supervision, and employ resident managers who are employees of 
the company itself. If possible, they I ike to have the development 
constitute a smal I neighborhood in and of itsel1. 
The companies opposed to investment in housing developments 
gave severa l reasons for their attitude. These are set down here just 
as they were recorded in the interviews: 
"Management problems resulting from multiplicity of 
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tenants." 
"The insurance company is looked upon as a charitab le 
in stitution which is supposed to provide a lot more servic~s 
than the ordinary landlord, and a lot of bad pub! ic relat ions 
ensue." 
"Problems of operation, rent contro ls, tenant rela-
tions --too many minor comp laints." 
"Low y ield on this type of investment.H COI'le company 
emphasized that It is a very low yield, and produced a com-
parative tabulation of a! I major housing developments which 
conclusively proved the point.) 
"Don't feel insurance compan ies are well adapted to 
development and management of these properties." 
Another important consideration is stated by Mr. Jewett as 
follows: "It is very seldom that a management problem is not present 
and as on ly short-term leases are avai !able, no fi xed rate of return 
over a long period can be assured."* 
It would seem to be a fair conclusion that no great amount of 
activity in housing developments is li~ely t o be forthcoming from the 
New England companies in the near future. 
As stated earlier, the bulk of I ife insurance companies' equities 
in real estate are purchased through the sa le and lease-back . In this 
con nect ion, it seemed worthwh i Je to inquire whether or not most proper-
ties acquired were purchased individua lly or as part of a group deal. 
*3, p. 175 
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Almost without exception the companies reported that alI purchases of 
real estate were negotiated on an individual basis. This presupposes, 
of co urse, that a development of reside~tial housing units or apartment 
bui ldlngs is considered as a single entity. Several companies mentioned 
that although they buy property on an individual basis, it quite often 
happens th~t a series of purchases results in ownership of a group of 
stores in the same chain, making it appear that several units had been 
bought at the same time. The onl y company to report that its property 
purchases are not always single transactions fixes its minimum real 
estate investment at $500,000. A property which exceeds this figure 
wi I I be bought by itself, but a property of lesser value, it purchased 
at alI, . wll I be combined with one ot more others to make a package 
whose value meets the minimum figure. 
As with alI other investments, the I ife insurance company must 
appraise the soundness and future worth of the real estate It buys. Two 
principal cr iteria on which to base a judgement are avai !able: the 
credit standing of the tenant and the intrinsic value of the property 
itself. Should either of these deteriorate, the company 1 s investment 
wi I I tal low suit. Only in multiple-occupancy property is the tenant•s 
credit not a factor; if the lease runs directly to the I ife compan y 
both tenants and tenure are variable elements and therefore cannot be 
reckoned in an estimate of the future strength of the investment. 
Questioning of the companies surveyed as to which of the two 
criteria they bel leved to be more important brought out the fact that 
even in quite fundamental aspects of investment pol icy there is apt to 
be divergence of opinion. Whereas this is to be expected where 
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individual, private ir.westors are concerned, it would ordinarily seem 
Jess 1 ikely to be the case with the large, sophisticated, institutional 
investors. 
Four out of the seven responding companies rep I led that they 
believed the tenant's credit to be the primary determinant of a proper-
ty's worth. One said that it gives leases only to very good risks, 
and a second concurred by saying that they prefer properties entirely 
occupied by a tenant of unquestionable credit standing. A third said 
that while they do look first to the tenant's credit, they give this 
standard only a slight edge over property value. 
Two companies hold the opposite view, and look to the intrin-
sic value of the property for protection against loss. One feels this 
to be especial Jy true for industrial properties. Few would argue the 
point; the specialized nature of most industrial properties, together 
with the eye] ical sensitivity of many manufacturing operations, leave 
the property value largely dependent upon the tenant's ability to 
conduct a profitable business at alI times. The other company to empha-
size intrinsic property value stated in answer to another question that 
with retai I locations they prefer a tenant who is financially strong. 
This is not necessarily contradictory, since any investor I ikes to have 
more than one indication of merit. 
The seventh company took an intermediate position, saying that 
they hoped not to put one criterion ahead of the other. Their feeling 
is that they should buy good real estate first and that, having this, 
the strong tenant wi I I follow as a matter of course. Their logic is 
not obscure, since by definition a "good" property would possess rei iable 
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earning power, which in turn means that the tenant should be financially 
responsible. 
The question "Do you ever invest in unimproved land?" was 
answered by most companies with an unqualified "no." This is regarded 
as a speculative practice and is therefore discouraged both by finance 
committees and by law. One company, while seeking land for a new home 
office bui !ding, did buy an unimproved parcel on the chance that the 
bui I ding might wei I be erected there and that the price wou ld soon go 
up when real estate operators learned of the company's plans. This was 
an entirely justifiable move, the more so since it was this land that 
the home office was later bui It on. (Conversation with a Prudential 
official ln the spring of 1956 disclosed that they are faced with a 
simi tar problem. Now that their plans to build in the Boston & Albany 
marshal I ing yards are pub I ic and are stalemated by the proposal to 
construct an expressway via the B&A road bed, there is every reason to 
-
expect that a I I I and not under opt ion w i I I be priced out of reason by 
the time the issue is decided.) 
2. Technique of Acquisition and Financing --The companies 
surveyed do not acquire their real estate investments directly through 
their own efforts, that is, they neither maintain a staff for direct 
sol !citation of purc hases, nor do they have branch organizations respon-
sible for procuring interesting situations. The companies were about 
evenly divided as to whether properties are brought to their attention 
through correspondents or by brokers. Four said their primary source 
is brokers, one going so far as to say that correspondents are entirely 
unsatisfactory in bringing good real estate investments to I ight. Three 
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of these said that they rei ied upon co rrespondents tor the balance o f 
the deals not submitted by brokers. Only one said that they were ap-
proac hed to any extent by the principal, that extent amounting to 
about 40% of alI transactions. 
The three companies not doing business primarily with brokers 
alI reported that correspondents were their main source of information, 
with brokers providing the remainder. These cor respondents are almost 
always established mortgage loan correspondents who, in the normal 
course of their mortgage field work, occasionall y see a wor~hwhi le 
equity investment and forward this information to the I ite compa ny . By 
and large, activity in real estate equities is apparently not great 
enough to sustain a correspondent doing this work only. 
Brokers, correspondents and di rect dealings with the other 
principal involved evidently account for the great majority o f purchase 
p1oposals. Onl y one company mentioned another source ; they have some 
deals referred to them by comme r rial banks. As with private placemen~s, 
the commercial bank is in a good position to act as intermediary, having 
constant relations as it does with both seekers and suppliers of funds. 
In orde r to find out whether it is the I lte insurance company 
or the tenant who typicall y provides the building bought by ~he I ite 
company, the question "Do you generally purchase your real estate from 
its present owner, or do you often finance the original construction? 11 
was asked. As in many other instances, responses to the question were 
not uniform. 
One company stated that it always buys bui !dings from the 
tenant. In other words, the company never bui Id s tor the tenant. For 
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that matter, this company wi I I not finance the construction either; the 
tenant is responsible for both administering and fin~ncing the construc-
tion. Once he has a completed bui !ding to offer the company wil I do 
business with him. Almost exactly the same practice is followed by 
another company, which rep I ied that it generally bu ys from the original 
owner but not quite always. 
Most of the companies four-- rep I ied that the bulk of 
their leasebacks involve buildings already in place, with purchase 
accordingly from the tenant. These four, however, stated that they 
have from time to time financed the original construction. In these 
cases it may be said that the company meets the vendor-tenant halfway; 
although the company does not who! ly provide the bui !ding, it at least 
provides funds to the tenant for his construction, after which he wi I I 
set I the building to the company and rent from them. On the face of it , 
this giving and then taking back the price of a bui !ding seems I ike a 
roundabout way for the I ife company to operate. It serves a useful 
purpose, however, by placing alI the risks attending construction upon 
the vendor-tenant, the I ife company taking title and assum i ng ownership 
ris ks only after the bui !ding is in p lace. 
Just as investment in unimproved land by a I ife i nsurance 
company might be considered speculative, so might the purchase of a 
building whose future occupancy had not been settled. It was not too 
surpr1sing, therefore, that when the companies were asked, "Do you ever 
invest in real estate without first securing a commitment from a future 
tenant to occupy the property?" alI seven answered in the negative. 
Only three qualified their answers, and this to only a minor 
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extent. One company which has investments in housing developments 
mentioned that ordinarily it is impossible to have alI the units rented 
before completion, to say nothing of accomplishing this before ~onstruc­
tion is started. Another company stated that they have bui It some 
bui !dings on speculation but that t his is a minor operation and includes 
multiple-occupancy business bui ]dings which were not entirely rented 
upon completion. The third company said that only in the case of a 
shopping center not fully rented at the outset have they invested in 
properties lacking firm commitments to rent. 
3. Types .£f. Leases -- Jewett states: 11 0f paramount importance 
in the purchase of real estate is the t ype of lease which may be 
arranged. If the insurance company is not set up to manage real estate 
from the ground up, then long-term absolutely net leases are the most 
desirable. In such cases the tenant pays taxes, operating expenses, 
insurance, main t ains and manages the property -- the owner merely 
co I I ects the month I y rent checks. 11* 
None of the seven companies responding in this section indi-
cated that they had any desire to cope with the management of the 
properties they own. Cost considerations force them to operate their 
real estate departments with as smal I a staff as possible, leaving few 
or no people free to perform an ything other than analytical and · 
processing work. In light of Mr. Jewett's statement it wou ld seem 
reasonable to expect these companies alI to request net leases on their 
rentals, and this proved to be substantially the case. Three of the seven 
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companies always insist upon absolutely net leases, and the other tour 
differ only slightly in their policies. 
Two said that they require net leases a majority of the time, 
and one of these mentioned that his company and several others known 
to him often refer to the long-term net lease as the "carefree" t ype, 
tor fair I y obvious reasons. A I I of the companies interviewed, i.nc i-
dentally, stated directly or intimated that they much prefer long-term 
leases. This , of course, is completely in keeping with the long-pul I 
nature of practically all I ite insurance company investments. 
Two companies are somewhat less rigid in their insistence 
upon absolutely net leases. One stated that although they prefer the 
net type they are operating a good many properties on gross lease, 
Including properties with miscellaneous tenants (e.g., office bui !dings.) 
The other said that they would not require an absolutel y net rental with 
a wei !-located property leased to a retail establishment whose rental 
was based in part on a percent -of sales. Si~ce this sort of situation 
is regarded as a prime real estate investment, it may be assumed that 
a sizeable proportion of this company's rentals are not on a net basis. 
Reluctance to become involved in management problems has given 
rise to another lease device, the "sandwich" lease. Referring again to 
Jewett: "The so-called 'sandwich' lease is one in which the owner of 
the property leases it on an absolutely net basis and the lessee in turn 
sublets the space to various tenants II 
"Life insurance companies eneral ly do not purchase real estate 
which poses a management proble; therefore, office bui !dings 
occupied by numerous tenants an other bui ldlngs with multiple-
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tenant occupancy are se I dom faun in these portfo I ios. 
Occasionally, however, the price Is so favorable and the 
net return so good that such a p rchase wi I I be made, but 
the Investor must have 
to be successful. The return 
correspondingly great. Taxes 
increase faster than renta ls. 
nded management department 
good, but the risks a re 
operat in g expenses may 
habi I itation may be 
necessary. Poor management may increase costs unnecessar-
il y with a corresponding shrinka e in the yie ld . Poor 
management ma y not secure the t tenants at the best 
prices whic h also, of course, affects the y ield. Usuall y , 
therefore, when a bui !ding of this type is found in the 
portfo I lo of an insurance compan , it Is on the "sandwi ch " 
lease basis which eliminates the necess ity of management 
by the insurance company . "* 
Following Mr . Jewett's I ine of reasoning again would seem to 
lead to the expectation that the nies surveyed often uti I ize the 
"sandwich" lease. This was not the s ituation, however. Four of the 
seven companies reported that e never used the "sandwich 11 
lease. These are some of the reasons offered: "We don't want an yo ne 
else involved; we want a! I the benefits of ownership, and we want to 
be our own boss." "We can make bett r decils in other areas" (not 
explained.) "We are not interested in owning leaseholds. From the 
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standpoint of securi ty you're better off own in g in fee" (i.e ., out-
right.) 
Two of the three remaining companies stated that although they 
have used the "sandwich" lease, they have done so on only one or two 
occasions. One owns a "sandwiched" shopping center and office bui !ding, 
but said that they wi I I enter into this kind of arrangement only when 
c ircumstances make It possible for them to purchase at 10 to 20% of 
appraised value . 
Only one compa ny said that most of its rentals are of the 
"sandwich " type, with the operator paying a fixed rental p lu s a percent 
of hi s net income. This company reports having had sat isfactory experi -
ence with the "sandwich" lease, and gives the chief advantage as being 
the tact that the operator serves as a buffer between compla~nlng 
tenants and the company. 
4. Retention of Control The corporation desirous of fi-
nancing new property or borrowing on o ld has several alternatives, chief 
of which are mortgaging and sale and lease-back. On the face of it, 
these two appear to be quite dissimilar, but from the insurance compa ny 's 
standpoint they ma y merge into very like operations . Ordinari ly, the 
insurance company wi I I not loan more t han two-thirds the appraised value 
of a property on a mortgage. This mortgage is gradually amortized and 
at maturity an unencumbered title vests in the mortgagor . If on the 
other hand, the financing of this same property follows the route of 
sale and lease-back, the net effect may be one of a 100% mortgage pro-
vided by the insurance company. Standard practice is to apply enough 
of the rental fee to depreciation that by the time the original lease 
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has expired the asset wi I I have been written down to zero on the 
insurance company 1 s books. This, of course, is analogous to the 
amortization in a mortgage. If, furthermore, the terms of the lease 
permit the lessee to renew his lease for some token rental or to re-
purchase the property at book value (zero) plus a smal I premium, the 
insurance company is in effect s urrendering future control over the 
property just as surely as though it had taken a mortgage, but has done 
so without benefit of the protective cushion offered by the unmortgaged 
one-third of value. Thus the term "100% mortgage" for the leaseback 
containing such provisions. In order to sound out the seven companies 
on their attitude toward retaining control, questions on the use of both 
renewal and repurchase options were asked. 
None of the companies expressed any inclination toward vol-
untarily offering renewal options, but alI said that they have at one 
time or another granted them. To this extent, then, these companies, 
having once made what they consider to be a good investment, are anxious 
to continue to enjoy the benefits der iv ing from that investment for a 
long as possible~ Three companies stated spec ificall y that they do not 
I ike renewal options, and several said directly or Indirectly that they 
want to keep control as long as possible. 
In negotiations with vendor-tenants one company does its best 
to obtain as high a renewal rental as possible but finds t hat, as in 
other fields of endeavor, competitive conditions in the market for sale 
and lease-back funds determine the final agreement. Another fi xes its 
renewa Is at the same I eve I contained in the or i gina I I ease or, fa i i i ng 
this, leaves them on a future arbitration basis. Another tends to be 
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more I iberal, and quite often grants two successive options to renew for 
ten years each at the end of the original lease. A fourth stated that 
Its renewals typically run for 20 to 25 years, giving the tenant effective 
control for 40 to 50 years. (The term of the original lease given by 
most compan ies is 20 to 30 years .) This company usually scales its re-
newals down to one half the original rental fee or less, and may taper 
them down successively in s ucceeding renewals. A fifth company follows 
somewhat the same pattern, and offers a renewal option in which the 
rental, based on original purchase price, steps down 4%-3%- 2%-1 % at 25-
year intervals in successive renewals. Probably the only note of defiance 
sounded by any of the companies was the statement by one that on indust r i-
al properties they wi I I grant renewals only where the property wi I I have 
been fully written off at the time the option may be exercised. The 
foroe of t his statement is co nsiderabl y lesse ned by real lzation of the 
fact that few compan ies would permit any other arrangement, industrial 
concern or no. Perhaps the only true stalwart was the company which 
admitted having granted renewals, but only at rentals higher t han those 
contained in the or i gina I I eases. 
Much stiffer resistance to encroachment upon control was found 
in the matter of repurchase options. Four of the responding compan ies 
have never granted them, two stating that the y would not consider doing 
so at any time in the future. Two other companies said that they a llow 
repurchase options only occasionally, in order to meet competition. All 
the companies voiced a wholehearted aversion toward this provision, with 
two adding that they considered it as leaving them with nothing more than 
the "100% mortgage" referred to previously. Only one company reported 
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granting repurchase options as much as half the time, and said that they 
do their best to avoid them whenever possible. 
When an option to repurchase is finall y ai lowed by a I ife 
company, it is frequently of the "rejectable" t ype . Broadly, this pro-
v ision gives the tenant the choi ce of cancel I ing the lease and buying 
the property at book value plus a smal I premium, or simply cancel I ing 
the lease altogether. The option gets its name "rejectable" from the 
fact that the final decision I ies not with the tenant but with the 
insurance company, which may elect to ignore the tenant's request 
entirely. One company sometimes agrees to allow the tenant to purc hase 
the property before the lease is up at book value plus a premium. This 
premium over time is sca led upward in relation to the concurrent book 
value, inasmuc h as the book value itself bears a dec I inlng relation to 
actual market value. This foll ows from the fact that the investment is 
written off by the insurance company more rapidl y than it actually de-
preciates. Thus,at the end of the original thirty-year lease the book 
value is nothing, while the land and building, if new to begin with, 
sti I I possess both market and rental value. 
One officer, in discussing his company's overall pol icy on 
investment in real estate equities and particularly leasebacks, s uc-
c inctly summarized the feeling most insurance companies have toward 
renewal and repurchase options. His comments ran something I ike this: 
"We prefer not to go Into leaseback deals. It seems to us that yo u 
might as wei l have the future benefits accruing from ownership, and some 
of these don't come through leasebacks" (when they conta in options to 
renew and/or repurchase.) "These benefits include market appreciation 
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and ability to rent at the going market in the future." Cln leasebacks) 
''you too often get hung up by the rates contained In old contracts for 
renewals, and repurchase options fai I In the same way to allow for in-
flation." 
5. New England Real Estate --Coming once again to the re-
gional aspect of I ife insurance investmen~ pol icy, the companies were 
asked whether or not they tended to favor the New England area in their 
purchase of real estate. It was thought that the investment officers 
might view New England real estate from the same angle as direct place-
ments as regards locatlonal convenience in orJginatlng and servicing 
the investment, but this aspect was not brought up by any of those 
interviewed. 
The seven responding companies uniformly denied showing any 
preference toward New England in picking up real estate equiti.es. The 
answer coming closest to indicating regional loyalty was the statement 
by one company that they have in th? past invested quite heavily in New 
England properties. As a result of this and legal I imitations upon the 
percent of total assets permitted in real estate this compan y now feels 
it would be unwise to jeopardize diversifi cation by investing further in 
this area. The company did say that it has found the return on Ne-w 
England properties to be less favorable than that obtainable elsewhere, 
and is now stressing the central and West Coast areas in its equities. 
A second company stated that although they do not deliberately 
favor the New England region, they do have a I ittle higher Investment 
per capita here. The y said this is not intentional, but that New 
England borrowers in the natural course of events are more apt to come 
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to the New England institutional lenders. The only other indi cation of 
regional partiality was a third company's statement that they do tend 
to favor the home office state, if not the others. This compa ny is 
trying at present to place equities in transportation centers (e.g., 
Chicago) or growth areas. 
Two companies reported that they have no particular area pref -
erence in real estate investment. One said that its pol icy is flex ible, 
and that each case is examined on Its own bottom, with diversification 
always a factor. The other said only that they avoid smal I towns and 
isolated properties "out in the sticks," because of poor marketabi I ity. 
Questioning on this subject provoked from two of the companies 
the sort of response that was expected throughout the survey but se ldom 
received. Both these companies stated flatly that they prefer to buy 
property outside New England. One said that opportunities were better 
elsewhere where there is more growth; the other said simply, "Conditions 
are not favorab le here." 
Whether or not the New England region as a whole is unattrac-
tive investment- wise, there is I ittle doubt that its largest city 
presents no great temptation to prospective property owners. The fiscal 
po licies of Boston's city fathers have long been subject to debate, if 
not ridicule. To find out how the New England I ife insurance companies 
feel about this, they were asked, "What problems do you find in the 
ownership of Boston real estate?" 
Three of the companies were able to dismiss the question with 
the repl y t hat they own no real estate whatsoever in Boston. This in 
itself is a fairl y eloquent commentary on the situation. Added to this, 
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a fourth company owns three properties in Boston, but revealed that alI 
were acquired as a result of mortgage foreclosures brought about largely 
by the city's onerous property tax. 
As might be expected, the companies were unanimous in giving 
the tax situation as the number one problem in owning Boston .real estate. 
It was menTioned that on net leases the tenant has I ittle left to apply 
towards rent after settling his tax bi I I, and on gross leases rents have 
to be extremely high to recapture tax payments. Two comp9ny officers 
were of the opinion that taxes are not a problem on net leases, since 
the burden Is shifted to the tenant. This sort of pifferentiation 
between tax impact and incidence seems a I ittle unrealistic, however, 
and one of the two men admitted that the tenant Is under an additional 
burden which makes It difficult for him to meet a fair net rental. He 
stated that his company wi I I not give ground, however, and always insists 
upo~ what they judge to be an adequate rental. 
Another officer advanced the view that the tax situation 
actually creates no problem for the insurance companies, since most 
real estate borrowers, if they don't I ike the tax picture, wi I I choose 
to locate els~where. Those who select Boston presumably do so with 
thei~ eyes open, having determined that they are capable of meeting 
the demands of the property tax. 
6. Profitabl I ity --When questioned as to how the return on 
their real estate holdings compared with that earned by other types of 
investments, a! I but one of the seven companies rep! led that real estate 
leads the field. Since some of the companies gave figures in their 
answers, Chart I I is introduced at this point to make poss i ble a 
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compariso n with the net return earned by alI investments of the fifteen 
largest I ife insurance companies in 1955. Notice that seven out of the 
eight compan ies surveyed are included In thi s top fifteen. In Chart I I 
the solid portion of each bar represents the earned yield on investments 
held; the shaded portion s hows net capital gains realized as a percent 
of assets owned. 
Two companies reported that their yield on real estate has 
been substantially higher than that from other assets. One said that 
real estate in 1955 netted 7% on present amortized value. The other 
stated that while the yield on mortgages after field office and co r re-
spondent expenses was 4.072% in 1955, the comparable figure for real 
estate was 7.550%. 
Three of the companies said only that the return on real 
estate was "higher". One gave their yield on equity real estate as 
ranging from four t6 five percent. Another said that after alI expenses 
their mortgage return was 3.98,%, whereas after depreciation and amor - · 
tization about 5% was earned on housing and 4.8% on other properties 
owned. This compa ny has apparently enjoyed better-than-average 
success with its housing properties. It should be noted that the rate 
earned on real estate is not directl y comparable between companies, 
because of variations In comp uting the amortization which is deducted 
from the gross yield to arrive at net . One of the companies replying 
that their owned real estate returned a higher yie ld than other assets 
added that this was onl y reasonable, s ince there is greater risk 
inherent in real estate than in the other forms of investment. 
The remaining two compa nies were less positive In asserting 
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the leadership of real estate yields. One said their real estate return 
was "a I ittle bit" higher, adding that their operating costs in this 
segment of the port folio tend to be somewhat lower. The last company 
could sa y only t hat the y ield on owned rea l estate was higher than on 
their bonds, but somewhat lower than that returned by mortgages. 
7. Amortization-- As mentioned above, amortization practices 
vary 9mong the I ife insurance companies. The seven companies surveyed 
in this field were asked to describe the basis on whi c h they amort ize 
owned real estate. Rep ! ies were given both in terms of the period over 
whi c h the prope r t y is written off and the percentage of valuation c harged 
off yearly. 
Two of the companies using the former method of description 
said that the period they employ ranges from 20 to 30 years . One said 
that the concentration was around 25 years, with a very few leases 
written for only 10 years. A third said that the period averages 25 
years, and the fourth gave a range of 15 to 30 years. The spokesman 
for this last company ventured the opinion that I ife insurance companies 
are creating "hidden" assets in real estate, since the book value of 
properties are typically reduced at a more rapid rate than the properties 
are depreciating physically. 
Three companies chose to describe their amortization pol lcies 
in terms of the percentage of valuation charged off yearly. Basing 
rentals also on a percentage of the property 's sa le price, one company 
c redits 3.6% to amortization, and takes the ba lance as the amortization 
basis. Their net rentals run from 5.5 to 9%. A seco nd fi xes its 
minimum charge-off at 2%, and on industrial bui !dings wi I I write a 25-
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year lease it the rental equals 7% of sale price, allowing for appl !ca-
tion of 2.5% to amortization. The last company usually credits 4% of 
rentals to earnings and the ba lance to amortization, but says this 
varies. It was brought out by this company that I ite companies, I ike 
many other enterpr ises, keep two sets of books. For taxes they take 
the same depreciation as any other concern would, but amortization 
depends upon the type of property and length of lease. 
8. Real Estate Ownership vs . Mortgages --The final facet of 
investment judgement to be inquired about in th is area related to the 
considerations that would lead a I ife insurance company to purchase 
property rather than taking a mortgage. As discussed earlier, the two 
are much alike In some respects . 
The rep! i es given seem to indicate that the primary determi-
nant is the tenant's financial strength. On ly the stronger c redits 
get the sale and leaseback deals; those of lesser standing must depend 
upon mortgages, in which the I ife company Is not t he so le party supply-
ing the funds that finance the property. Other considerations include 
the location of the property, the type of bui !ding (whether or not it 
is single-purpose), and how c lose the insurance company is to the legal 
maximum of permitted real estate Investment. One compa ny states that 
where there are no repurchase options and the property appears to have 
a high residual value, they feel that ownership is preferable to 
taki ng a mortgage. 
In discussing this ques tion, the companies gave a number of 
advantages t hey believed to be associated with real estate equities . 
The one most frequently mentioned was the higher return derived from 
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ownership as opposed to mortgages. The fact that real estate may act 
as a hedge against inflation, and provides the only opportunity outside 
of common stock to rea.l ize substantial market appreciation influences 
the thinking of several companies. One officer said that through real 
estate ownership a I ife company ca n get the benef its of ownership, which 
presumably include appreciation in value. Another advantage cited was 
the fact that the company ~oes not have to grant the privilege of pre-
payment as is often the case with mo r t gages, making for a more s table 
and last ing asset. 
Two advantages that were given have been covered earlier, 
namel y, that real estate write- off's result in the creation of "hidden" 
assets, and that there is a higher pe rcent of va lu e in vested in any 
given property meaning, among other things, a lower unit cos t of 
origination. The final advantage sugges t ed was the fact that the real 
estate portfoli o, unlike the bond portfolio, cannot be "raided." In 
other words, the in vestment cannot be retired by t he borrower through 
cal I provi sions when interest r ates drop. 
I V-. MORTGAGES 
A. Backgro un d 
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Life insurance companies have rei led for many years upon 
mortgage loans as an outlet for a large proportion of their investment 
funds. The advantages of mortgages as investments a r e summar ized by 
L. Douglas Meredith as follows: 
''I . Abundant security in the form of rea l property 
and debt-paying capac it y of the debtor. 
11 2 . Attractive income, depending, of course, upon 
the relative condition of the mortgage market and other 
Investment markets . 
11 3. Attractive maturities. 
11 4. The possibll ity of high geographic diversification. 
11 5. High diversification of cred it risks . 
11 6 . A high degree of liquidity wh ic h in former years 
has not been an attribute of mortgage loans. 
11 7. Funds invested In mortgage loans are directed, 
generall y speaking, to high ly commendable purposes which 
contribute to e levation of tile nation's standard of I iv i ng. 11* 
As shown by Chart Ill , the proportion of I ife insuran ce 
companies' tota I asse-t-s represented by mortgages dec I i ned throughout the 
period 1927 - 1945, dropping to 14.8% In 1945 and 1946. Since that time 
however, the trend has been upward, with mortgages occup y ing over 32% 
*3, pp . 104 & 105 
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BONDS AND MORTGAGES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS 
ALL U.S. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES, 1925 - 1955 
BONDS MORTGAGES 
AIIOUNT PERCENT OF AMOUNT PERCENT OF 
(MILLIONS) ASSETS (MILLIONS) ASSETS 
1955. • 48, 100 53.~ s 29,300 32.Mo 19M 48,294 54.8 25,976 30.7 
1953 44,402 56.5 23,322 29.7 
1952 41,974 57.2 21,251 29.0 
1951 39,650 58.1 19,314 28.3 
1950 39,366 61.5 16,102 25.1 
1949 39,274 65.9 12,906 21.6 
1948 37,979 68.4 10,833 19.5 
1947 36,,757 71.0 a, 675 16.8 
194e 35,3150 . 73.4 7, 155 14.8 
1945 32,805 72.8 6,836 14.8 
1940 f7,092 55.5" 5,972 19.4 
1935 10,041 43.3 5,357 23.1 
1930 6,43,1 34.1 7, 598 40.2 
1925 4,333 37.6 4,808 41.7 
BONDS o-o--o 
1935 1940 1945 1950 
• PRELIIIIIIARY 
Source: Taken by' permission from the files of one of the companies surveyed. (Same 
figures given in in source #16, p. 74, except for year 1955 as corrected.) 
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of a I I I i fe company portfo I ios in 1955. The 1956 Life Insu rance Fact 
Book gives this brief sketch of mortgage activity in 1955: 
11 Mortgage lending activities of U.S. I ife insurance 
compa nies established a record in 1955, in keeping with 
the continued boom in residential bui !ding and other 
cohst ruction. The mortgage holdings of the I ife . 
compan ies increased by nearly $3.5 bi I I ion during the 
year to bri ng the total to $29.4 bi I I ion by the year-
end. The previous peak annual gain in mortgage loans 
was $3.2 bi I I ion in both 1950 and 1951. The increase 
in 1954 was $2.7 bi I I io n. As a result of the activity 
in 1955, mortgage holdings of the I ife companies came 
to just under one-th ird o f alI assets at the end o f 
the year, the highest such proportion since the early 
J930 IS. 11* 
Although mortgage activity by I ife insurance compan ies has 
been high of late, no great amount o f space wi I I be devoted to this 
investment medium here. As with bonds, investment policies in the 
mortgage field have been shaped by many years of practice, and are now 
undergoing comparative ly I ittle c hange. 
B. Survey 
I. Mortgage Sources --As in real estate investments, the 
mortgage loan correspondent is the dominant source of the mortgage 
department's business. AI I of the eight companies surveyed reported 
* 16, p. 74 
Page 87 
That most of their mortgage loans were originated by cor respondents. 
Some of the other large I ife insurance companies maintain branch offices 
to secure mortgage business, but these play a smal I part in the companies 
interviewed. In only one case were branch offices said to be of any 
real importance; this company obtains approximately 40% of its mortgages 
via this method. Another company used to have half a dozen branch 
offices, but these have alI been closed down. A third comp an y s tated that 
it used branc h offices for farm lnens , but +hct +h8 ~~ l v branch off i r.~ 
maintained for non-farm loans was thA one in the home r i+v . nne cnmoanv 
has nine zone offices, but these are simply headquarters for correspondents 
in neighboring areas. 
Most of the companies reported having a c lose relationship 
with their mortgage loan correspondents. This relationship is often 
described as being 11 continulng and direct, 11 as opposed to the s ituation 
in whi c h the correspondent has no d irect tie to the I ife company and 
does business with it on ly intermittentl y. The relati onship is often 
forma I i zed by contract, which may be ca nce I I ab i e at the .I i fe compan y 's 
opt ion . One of the companies stated that it has complete co ntrol over 
its co rrespondents in that the co rrespondent has no vested interest and 
the company is free to terminate the relationship at an y t ime . A large 
part of the correspondent ' s income is derived from servicing loans made 
previous ly . This includes co llecting and forwarding interest payments, 
making periodic reports on the condition of the .property , and the I ike. 
Whether or not the correspondent receives compensation for or iginating 
the Joan in the first p lace depends upon the po l icy of the company he 
works for . One of the companies sa id that they pa y a finder's fee, but 
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another does not. 
Three companies gave secondary mortgage loan sources other 
than cor respondents and branch off ices . Two said that so me of their 
business comes directly from t he borrower, one stating that about a 
third of their mortgages are p laced direct ly with the mortgagor. And 
one company gets most of t he mortgages not provided by cor respondents 
from mortgage brokers. 
2 Farm vs. ~ Mortgag es -- In I ife insurance investment 
parlance, non-f arm mortgages may be referred to by that name, or may 
be called "city" mortgages . Both terms wi II be used here . The com-
panies s urve yed were by no means unanimous In their op inion of farm 
mortgages. 
Five companies carrv farm mortaaaes in their nnrtfol ios . 
These compan ies gave the percentage of tota l mortgages represented by 
farm loan s . and in descending order thes e were 25.5% . 2 1.3%, 17.5%, 
I I . 5% and I i%. One compa ny said that they I ike farm mortgages for the 
divers if icat ion they offer, but find di sadvantages in their rapid turn -
over and the low return due to the competiti veness o f the f ie ld. Another 
compa ny stated that to the extent that they are able to proc ure fa r m 
mo rtgages they do, since t hey fee l that a proper ly- made farm mortgage 
is the count ry ' s bas ic secur ity-- people have to eat (more or less 
di rec t quot e . ) Two of the companies have a fairl y high proportion of 
loan s on larger ranches, and especi all y I ike those with oi I we ll s --
not too s urprisingl y . 
The spread of I 1% to 25.5% of mortgage portfolio in fa rms 
given above shows that t here Is no ge nera l agreement as to the intrins ic 
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worth o f farm loans . In addition, two of the three remaining companies 
have no farm mortgages at alI , and the third has on ly 1% of its mortgage 
portfolio in farms . Reasons gi ven by thes e companies for their dis I Ike 
of farm mortgages in cluded (a) lower y ields, (b) higher cost of origina-
tion, (c) expense of operation, and (d) the fact that man y of these loan s 
have come to grief In years gone by . 
When asked what t ype of non-farm mo r tgage they felt to be the 
best inves tment, the compan ies again dis p layed no uniformit y of response. 
Two companies stated that they pre fer residential one to four-famil y 
properties. One of t he two s aid that they found conventional mortgages 
t o be more practi cable than VA -gua ranteed or FHA-insured loans, s in ce 
there 1 s I ess red tape and a better t ype o f owner , i . e., the owner has 
a hi gher equity in the pro perty . In contrast, another compa ny which 
agrees that co nventional loans are preferable wou ld rather invest in 
commerc ial t han residential pro perties. This company s ided with the 
majority, inasmuch as f ive of the compan ies agreed that in come-producing 
properties y ielded higher ret urns than thos e bui It for hous ing. Two 
companies conc urred in say ing that one of the princ ipal drawbacks found 
in residential housing is the smal I unit s ize, resulting in higher cos ts 
per mortgage. 
No one t ype of commerc ial property was s ingled out by the five 
companies as being best. Among the various choices were (a) s hopping 
cen t ers, espec i a I I y where the I i fe company has ass l gnments on I eases, 
(b) retai I stores, (c ) apartments and hotels, (d) ware houses, a lthough 
these were conceded to be riskier than most others, and (e) a lmost any 
income-producing property which is not too much of a single purpose 
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operation. 
3. Regional Preference in Residential Loans-- The middle and 
northern sectors of the eastern seahoard con+ain a high proportion of the 
country's financial institutions, including those which are suppliers of 
mortgage money. According to some I ines of economic thought, the mere 
clustering of physical lending facilities should not necessarily lead to 
a I ike concentration of the funds themselves, i.e., the networks of 
financial communication should provide the mob! I ity of capital necessary 
to substantially equalize interest rates on a geog raphical basis. In 
order to appraise this theory in the cold, empirical I ight of day-to-day 
investment experience, the question was asked, "Do you expe r ience diffi-
c ulty in placing residential mortgages i n New England due to the concen-
tration of mortgage money here, especially in the hands of mutual savings 
banks?" 
The rep I ies received bear out the suspicions of economists who 
question the complete mobi I ity of capital. Seven companies answered this 
quest ion, and four stated unequ i voca I I y that the supp I y of mortgage 
money in New England is greater than the demand, relative to other 
sec tions of the country, and that yields on mortgages here are corre-
spondingly lower. Several companies intimated that mutual savings banks 
wi I I make mortgage loans at rates unacceptable to most I ife companies, 
and that they thereby gain a competitive edge. 
The other three companies gave what amounted to the same 
answer: they have practically no residential mortgages outstanding in 
New England. One company stated directly that the main reason they 
have not placed mortgages in New England is the stiff competition among 
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institutional lenders here. This company ta~es a certain amount of 
pride In the higher-than-average return their mortgages earn, and is 
careful not only to keep personnel and other costs at a minimum but also 
to seek out areas and properties in which yie lds are high. As a conse -
quence, they invest not on ·ly outside New England but for the most part 
in commercial rather than residential mortgages. 
Having establ !shed that New England residential mortgages are 
not prof itable for the companies surveyed, it seemed logical to inquire 
just whi ch regions were favored. The answers provide some indication of 
what areas the companies expect to undergo the greatest population growth 
in the future. 
The region mentioned most often as providing good residentia l 
loans was California and the West Coast. One company said that a lthough 
they have no correspondents in this territory they neverthe less rate it 
as the best, and are always happy to receive mortgage appl !cations from 
their pol icyholders there. The southern and central southwestern states 
tied for a close second, with Texas running a I ittle behind In third 
place. One company gave Oklahoma (several companies lean heavil y toward 
oi !-producing states for both residential and commercial loans), and, 
surprising ly enough, a company whi ch affirmed that mortgage competition 
was keen in New England and that they had never been aggressive in this 
area gave the Atlantic seaboard as far west as Pittsburg as be in g good 
mortgage territory. 
4. Mortgages vs. Rea l Estate Ownership -- Having asked in the 
section on real estate what would lead the company concerned to own 
property rather than taking a mortgage on it, it seemed natural to turn 
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the question around in this section. Of course, the answers given here 
repeated a good deal of what was said in the previous section but, as 
was hoped, a few new ideas were introduced. 
The point of primary emphasis was the tact that real estate 
ownership is a creature of too recent birth to have attained the stature 
of mortgage loaning. Typical rep I ies were, "We don't care tor ownership 
at all," "-We would always take a mortgage unless ... ,""We would rather 
have a mortgage under any circumstances, 11 and so forth. Most of the 
companies feel that only where the yield to be derived from a sale and 
lease-back is considerably higher than the corresponding mortgage rate 
should the former channel be uti I ized. At the same time, the c redit 
of the vendor-tenant must be exce I I ent in order that he qua I i ty tor a 
leaseback, unless he is doing business with a company which weights 
intrinsic property value more heayi ly. 
One company I isted the conditions under which it prefers to 
take a mortgage as being, (a) when the building is a special purpose 
type, (b) when the applicant's credit is not high, and (c) when the 
location is poor. A second company said,"\ve always take a mortgage 
unless there is no alternative because we feel that (a) the company was 
originally designed tor this, (b) mortgages offer better security 
because the owner has an equity, and (c) under current tight money 
conditions the company should concentrate on its primary function" 
(no further elaboration.) 
One important reason for the prominence of mortgage activity 
by I ife insurance companies today, of course, is the helping hand being 
lent by government agencies such as the FHA, the VA, and the Federal 
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National Mo rtgage Association. This area of mortgaging was considered 
to be too broad a subject to be treated here. 
V. VARIABLE ANNUITIES 
A. Problems Encountered 
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Having dealt with fixed dollar contracts ever since its incep-
tion, it now appears probable that the I ife insurance industry wi II have 
to begin adjusting Its thinking in the near future to encompass contrac-
tual payouts keyed to the behavior of common stocks. If permissive 
legislation is enacted, the companies wl I] be able to sel I annuities 
whose .payments w iII be approxImate I y equa I 1 n purchas 1 ng power but not 
in dollar size. EVen the companies which presently disapprove of vari-
able annuities may find themselves forced by competitive pressure into 
a field requiring a degree of ski I I in common stock investments which 
few investors can attain easily. 
Literatwre on the subject of variable annuities is abundant, 
and the issue a very broad one. This device is such a complete departure 
from the accepted forms of I lfe Insurance that a great many topics of 
discussion have been opened up, and the problems which rema in to be 
solved are innumerable. It would be much too presumptuous to suggest 
that this section more than scratches the surface of the great body of 
controversy surrounding this subject. A handful of questions was 
selected as being somewhat representative of some of the major areas 
of disagreement, and no attempt was made to pin the companies down on 
their answers. Only a very brief discussion of the pros and cons of 
each quest ion w iII be offered over and above the rep I i es g lven by the 
companies. 
These rep I i es, it shou. l d be noted, were at best sketchy and 
largely superficial. Had the answers given In the other sections been 
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of t he same calibre, this paper could never have been written, and the 
material in this section is not presented as providing any sort of 
~xhaust ive coverage. In severa I instances the questions evoked a bare 
"No comment," so that the answers give n here do not ref lect majority 
opinion. 
Several of the companies interviewed reported having no 
company pol icy on variable annuities, and man y of the rep! ies received 
are persona l op inions of the officers and analysts responding. This, 
taken together with the fact that the questions often drew comp lete 
blanks, reveals that whereas the variab le annuity is hotly debated in 
certain quarters, some of those most directl y concerned with its 
future outcome are content to remai n relatively un en lightened as t o 
its possible conseq uences. This Is not put forward as a cr iti cism, 
but only as an indication that the day when var iable annuities are 
widely accepted may be further away than some think. 
B. Survey 
I. Control Through Ownership One of the mo re fundamental 
issues to be raised by variable annuities concerns the voting power of 
common stock. Although I ife Ins uran ce companies have always been one 
of the industry's most important sources of long-term capita l, the 
c reditor securities held by them have e nabl ed them to exert direct 
control over the borrowing corporation onl y in time of distress, when 
indenture covenants have not been satis fied. Should the I ife insurance 
companies, through enabling variable annuity legi slation, come to hold 
an ything I ike the same proportion of alI outstanding common stock that 
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they now hold in debt securities, an enormous amount of voting rights 
and management control would be concentrated In the hands of a rela-
tively smal I group of institutions. Since effective control over many 
corporations whose shares are widely held ma y be gained by ownership of 
wei I under halt of the outstand ing common stock, the possibi I ity exists 
that I ite insurance companies, either Individually or in concert, might 
bring influence to bear on corporate affairs which would be alI out of 
proportion to their numerical size. 
When questioned as to whether or not they considered this 
po~sibi I ity to be a real one, none of t he spokesmen for the companies 
surveyed gave any indication that their company would not be interested 
in being able to exert such control. Three men said they thought there 
was no danger that this situation would ever arise, but the i r reasons 
did not include a statement to the effect that I ite insurance companies 
would not want to participate in the management of the corporations 
whose common stock they owned. One officer d id say that he did not think 
t he I ite companies would be interested in management control as long as 
the corporation was operating smoothly and profitably, but this is I ittle 
more than a platitude. 
One officer said that he doesn't think anybody knows the answer 
to thls question, but he is not disturbed. He stated that no individual 
company could conceivabl y exerc ise Inordinate control because legal 
I imitations wou ld be put on the maximum percentage of any one corpora-
tion's common stock that could be held by a s ingle I ife company. Life 
insurance companies would not dare to pool their Interests, he said, 
because this would be In violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. He 
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added that trust companies are the largest Institutional holders of 
common stock now, and that there is nothing to suggest that they have 
/ 
been attempting to exercise joint control. This officer's final comment 
seems to t ypify the attitude of the men who r ep I fed that they thought 
there was no danger of I ite companies exerting too much control: ''It's 
just something you wouldn't dare do." Another man, tor instance, said, 
"This is a false assumption, since all I ite insurance companies are 
deathly afraid of this charge." 
Three men conceded that there was some possibl I ity that I ite 
insurance companies might use their common stock voting power to domi-
nate corporate affairs. One suggested that since I ife companies some-
times get together to work out mutual problems, it might follow that they 
would pool their voting power, but that they would be aware of the danger 
of criticism and would, therefore, be most c ircumspect in their actions. 
Another officer said that he thought the danger of concentrated control 
could and should be eliminated through legislation requiring I ite insur-
ance companies to own only non-voting shares of common. Since non-voting 
common cannot be I isted on the New York stock _exchange, legislation such 
as this might wei I be impracti cal. In that event, this officer suggests 
that I ite companies could be I imited to a certain percentage of corpo-
ration's vote, regardless of the number of shares held. This proposal 
is not withou+ its drawbacks either, but might prove to be a step in the 
right direction. 
2. Competition with Mutual Funds -- Ownership o f shares in the 
so-cal led mutual funds, or open-end investment trusts, accomplishes some 
of the same ends that would be achieved by participation in a va riable 
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annuity plan. Income Is received from a diversified and expertly managed 
portfolio of common stocks, with a good chance of appreciation in both 
income and capital during inflation. Judging by their vociferous oppo-
sition to variable annuity enabling legislation of late, the mutual funds 
evidently regard variable annuities as a serious competitive threat. In 
order to find out if the companies surveyed shared the same view, they 
were asked whether they considered that variable annuities would be in 
dJrect competi~ion with mutual funds. 
Five officers answered In the affirmative, and a sixth s aid 
that although variable annuities as sold to individuals would compete 
with mutual funds, he believes that in the beginning at least they wi I I 
be sold on a group basis to businesses and institutions, and that under 
these circumstances there would be I ittle or no competition. it was 
brought out by one officer that mutual funds have always competed with 
I ife insurance companies, in the sense that both must draw from the same 
total fund of individuals' savings for the monies that they invest. 
3. Timing-- The value of the variable annuity depends 
c hiefly on the fact that common stocks have always outperformed creditor 
securities In income and appreciation during prosperity, as long as 
speculative issues are avoided. A high level of pro?perity such as the 
country is now enjoying, however, ma y lead to distortions in the relation 
different money market rates and y ields bear to each other. With a 
generally opttmistic outlook prevai I ing, enough investors ma y come to 
favor common stocks as to bid their prices up to where y ields on man y 
popular issues are quite low. The demand for bonds and mortgages, 
supported as it is by institutions, wi I I probably not dwindle enough 
--- ----- .... / 
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to prov ide a marked increase in these rates, other things being equa l ~ 
But if other things are not equal by v irtue of record expansi0n p lan s 
by indu s t ry with a co ncomitant demand for long-term deb t mo ney to 
finan ce these p lans, the long-term money market may experie nce consid-
erab le ti ghtness and high interest rates. This is roughly the s it uation 
as It exists today, with the differential between bond and stock yie lds 
a narrow one, and in some cases actually negative (I . e. , the bonds of 
a given corporation y ie lding more than Its commo n s t ock .) 
With such conditions preva i I ing, the variable annuity osten-
sfb ly loses .some of Its attracti veness when com pared with ins uran ce 
contracts based on credi tor secu riti es and given the assumption that 
t he next decade or two wi I I witness continued prosperity with onl y 
minor setbacks . The compa nies s urveyed were asked if they thought 
curren t money market co nditions were s uch that the y wou ld defer laun ch -
lng a var iab le ann uity plan untl I there had been some dec! ine in the 
stock market. Ma j o rity opinion was that thi s consideration is of I ittle 
or no importance . The long- r un, constant nature of I ife Insurance 
investing was emphasized as prov id ing do llar averaging in the truest 
sense of the term. Thus, a future drop in stock prices accompa nied 
by a corresponding rise in y ields wo ul d prod uce a lowe r average cost 
and a higher return per s ha re. But even if stock pr ices should continu e 
to rise indefinitel y, dollar cos t averaging wi I I prov ide an average 
cost over time wh ic h is less than the average o f a ! I the sepa rate pur-
c hase prices. If , furthermore, the differential betwee n bond and stock 
yie lds continues to di mini s h, t he common stockho lder st l I I be ne f its from 
increases in d ividends as related to the original pu~chase price. A 
Page 100 
bondholder who invested the same amount originally at the same rate or 
even highe~ co uld expect no similar in c rease In his co upon rate. 
Instead, he would stand t o take a capital los s on his Investment if 
rates rose, o r lose t he inves tment altogether by cal I if rates dropped . 
One anal ys t sided with the majority in form but not in s ub-
stance. It was hls feeling that a high stock market in itself provided 
a favorable atmosphere in whlc~ to initiate a variable annuity plan. 
His argument was basical /y psychological, stating that the most pro-
pitious time for I ife companies to interest people in a co ntract based 
on common stocks was when those common stocks were doing wei I. Waiting 
for a drop in s tock prices might lead to a dearth of va riable annuity 
buyers, were investor co nfidence s uffi cientl y shaken . 
4 . Options -- The question was as ked, ''Do you think a variab le 
annuity contract should properly have no cash or loan values, and no 
option for tak ing a lump s um cash payment when the pa yout period begins? 
In other words, should the annuitant be 1 locked in' during both the 
accumulation and payout periods in order that the contract I ive up to 
its name of 'annuity ' ?'' Whereas an y of these features may be inco rpo-
rated into a conventional annuit y, a variable annuity which could be 
cashed in at any time would be just that much more similar to a mut ual 
fund share. 
Three companies agreed that the participant should be locked 
In during the acc umulati on period. Otherwise, as one officer said, the 
averaging princ ipal would be violated. By the same token, a lthough a 
conventi onal annuity can sometimes be bought in one or a fe w large 
payments, it is essential that regular payments extending over a large 
Page 101 
part of the I ife of the annuitant be made when purchasing a var iabl e 
annuity, otherwise no advantage would be gained from a subsequent fal 1 
in stock prices. Two officers who largel y agreed with the idea that the 
participant should be locked in during the accumulation period neverthe-
less saw a certain amount of injusti ce in such a proposal. The variable 
annuity is as surely an investment as a stock certificate or the purchase 
of I ife insurance, and it seems unfair that an investor should be 
deprived of the privilege of borrowing against his asset in time of need. 
Practically alI investments have this advantage, and to dep r ive the 
variab le annuity holder of the right to col lateral ize against his 
investment would be to impose a definite hardship upon him. 
Only two officers ventured opinions on the terms t o govern the 
payout period, and these were directly conflicting. One said that the 
annuitant s hould not be locked in during the payout period, while the 
other said that there should be no options at alI during this period. 
5. Sale Through Subsidiary-- Life insurance compa nies have 
always dealt in fixed contractual obi igations and the pub! ic is wei I 
accustomed to this. Some critics of variable annuities say that it wi I I 
be very d ifficult for both the I ife companies and the pub! ic to readjust 
their thinking and habits enough to fully absorb the imp I !cations of a 
contract wit h no guaranteed payments. In rebuttal to this, advocates 
of the variable annuity say that the difficulty can be overcome by 
s etting up a separate, whol !y- awned subsidiary to carry on the variable 
annuity business. Were a I ife insurance company to sell variable 
annuities under its own name, it might find that It was placing its other, 
fixed products under a cloud. The variable annuity's salesman's biggest 
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argument would be the inabi I ity of fixed dollar contracts to protect 
against inflation and share in the country's growth. If, however, the 
variable annuity contract were to bear the name of another company, the 
connection between the two could be at least partially disguised for the 
average I ife insurance buyer. 
Since state laws often forbid a I ife company's owning more 
than a very smal I proportion of the common stock of another company, 
amendments to these statutes would be needed. This would probably pose 
no real problem, since it would not be necessary that the state legis-
latures endorse unlimited inv~stment in alI other corporations, but only 
in one set up speclflcal ly to administer variable annuities. 
Three of the companies surveyed concurred that the variable 
annuity should be administered and sold through a separate subsidiary. 
One officer mentioned that in addition to the foregoing, common stock 
investments are entirely different from bonds and mortgages , as would 
be the contracts and paperwork involved. A good deal of confusion and 
indecision might be avoided by carrying on these activities under a 
completely separate roof. The only other compan y responding on this 
matter feels that a completely detached subsidiary is not a necessity 
and might lead to duplication of effort. Segregation of assets was alI 
that was thought to be necessary. 
6. Growth Stocks --A growth stock is generally defined as one 
issued by a corporation whose earnings may be expected to increase from 
cycle to cycle at a more rapid rate than the economy as a whole grows. 
These stocks whose growth characteristics have been recognized by the 
market have had a large portion of that growth discounted in their 
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price, and often yield as I ittle as 1% or less. The companies surve yed 
were asked if they thought that variable annuity reserves should be at 
least partly invested in growth stocks in order to secure future strength 
and capital gains for the portfolio, despite the low initial yield. 
The companies were unan imous in affirming that growth stocks 
should be included in any variable annuity portfolio. None had any firm 
Idea as to how large a proportion of the portfol lo should be In growth 
stocks. One officer said that it would have to be a large percent, while 
another said onJ y that the prop6rtion would be up to the individual com-
pany. It was mentioned that the long-term aspect of I ife insurance 
investing was ideally suited to growth stocks, since these must be held 
over the long pull to obtain the benefits which have been partially paid 
for ih the original purchase price. None of the officers responding on 
this question acted as though they had devoted an y great amount of 
thought to it previously. However, the appeal of growth stocks is great 
enough in an optimistic environment I ike the present so that none of the 
officers hesi t ated more than momentaril y in stating that they would 
include this type of security in the portfolio for variable annuity 
reserves. 
7. Taxation --The companies were asked, "Do yo u see an y reason 
why the I ife company sel I ing variable annuities ~ hould not be subject to 
taxation on dividends and capital gains from the variable annuity reserves 
on an equal basis with mutual funds ?" As it stands now, mutual funds 
must pay out 90% of their accumulated income and capital gains each year 
in order to escape the 52% corporate tax rate. This places a large 
personal tax burden on the mutual fund shareholder who, if he is s aving 
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tor retirement would probably prefer to leave his accumulation to com-
pound tor him. A participant in a conventional annuity, on the other 
hand, has no tax I iabi I ity during the accumulation period as long as 
he does not cash out. During a large part of the payout period he wi I I 
probably have no salary or wage income, and wi I I therefore be taxed at 
a lower rate than the person holding mutual fund shares before ret ire-
ment. Furthermore, the I ite insurance company Itself benefits, because 
it pays only the same 7.8% tax on its annuity investment income that 
it pays on a! I other investment income. Some I ife insurance men oppose 
variable annuities on the grounds that they may lead to application of 
the regular corporate tax rate first to variable annuity income, and 
then by osmosis to the entire I ite company's earnings in the future. 
Most people would agree that the present tax setup is inequi-
table from the mutual funds' viewpoint. It might not be expected that 
the I ite insurance companies would see the problem in the same I ight, 
however . Nevertheless, half the officers responding here said that it 
seemed only fair to them that a I ite company sel I ing variable annuities 
should be taxed on the same basis as mutual funds. "Half the officers" 
is a I ittle misleading --only four had ever thought the question over 
tully enough to feel qualified to express an opinion. 
One of the men for equal taxation said that although thrift 
should not be taxed, variable annuities, with their fluctuating values, 
are not thrift, and unless they can be directly tied in with I ife insur-
ance they should be taxed the same as mutual funds. The other brought 
up t he fact that the taxation angle might be a good reason fo r a separate 
s ubsidiary. Whether or not the Bureau of l~ternal Revenue would view 
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the _subsidlary as being enough of a separate entity to Insulate the 
pa.renffi from the same kind of tax treatment is an open question. 
One spokesman said flatly that variable annuities should be 
taxed In the same manner as fixed annuities. In the opinion of the 
fourth officer, mutual funds and I ife company annuity departments are 
s uch dissimilar operations that it would be Impossible to tax them on 
an equal basis. For example, it would be extremely difficult to deter-
mine what each annuitant's share of the total income and capi tal gains 
accrued during a year was, and to pass this along to him In a form that 
he could make any sense out of for purposes of his tax report. 
8. Future Plans -- Six of the companies surveyed either have 
no concrete idea as to whether or not they would Institute a variable 
annuity plan if enabling legislation were passed, or are unwi I I ing to 
make their plans pub ] ic . Apparently most have adopted a wa it-and-see 
attitude. 
The remaining two compan ies stated that they would not favor 
adopting variable annuities if and when such a course became possible. 
One of these advanced an argument that has numerous supporters, namely, 
that they do not bel leve a I ife insurance company can sel I guarantees 
on one hand and uncertainties on the other. They do not see how the 
insurance salesman trained to sel I fixed ob i igations wi I I be able to 
present a variable annuity for what It is, rather than implying that 
it holds the same promises as the conventional type. This is not, of 
co urse , because alI insurance salesmen are dishonest, but only beca use 
they deal with a relatively unsophisticated pub I ic. 
The final company has pub I ished in its latest annual report 
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a statement of its attitude toward variable annuities, some of which may 
be of interest here: 
"The idea of the variable annuity is that sums paid 
in t~ buy it would be invested in common stocks. The r e-
sulting annuity income would increase with the market and 
hence protect the holder against c hanging money values. 
However, the idea that an institution can be so wise as 
to purchase a common stock portfolio that wi I I adequately 
protect income values for the future is pretentious. The 
insurance companies have justl y won a high reputation for 
competency in investments and for abi I ity to guarantee a 
fixed dollar obi igation. Insurance companies are not 
infal I lble experts in the field of common stocks; neither 
are trust departments nor investment trust managers. 
The ordinary buyer may too easily purchase a variable 
annuity under the mistaken theory that the insurance com-
pany is guaranteeing success in I inking the future benefit 
payments to the value of the dollar. 
"The fact that the stock market with Interruptions has 
tended upward for more than twenty years has created re-
sponses in t his co untr y which are not entirely heal t hy. 
The Stock Exc hange has soundly promoted the virtue _ of 
common stock purchase by indiv iduals as part of personal 
thrift plans which also include I ife insurance. The 
trouble is that the record of the stock market in recent 
years is better than normal expectancy . There are man y 
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people who have had a pleasant experience in the stock 
market and onl y a distant memory, or none at alI, of un-
pleasantness. Over-optimism has been accelerating and 
in the last few years has been approaching the dangerous 
level. 
"Despite our reservations about the variab le annuity, 
it is possible that this form may ultimately find a place 
in insurance sales. If it does, the enabling legislation 
ought to be drafted with special care for the protection 
of the pub I ic. Otherwise there cou ld be unfortunate con-
s~quen ces from the bel fef that the insurance compan ies 
were guaranteeing something that is not guaranteeable."* 
* 26, pp. 6 & 7 
VI. OVERALL INVESTMENT POLICY 
A. Introductory Remorks 
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The fino! section of the survey wos devoted to questions which 
were not reodi ly clossifiob le under the heodlngs covered thus f 0 r. Al-
most ol I of the topics in this section embroce more thon one division of 
o I ife insuronce compeny's portfolio, with perhops o slight tendonc y 
toword concentrotion in the ''industria l and misce l laneous'' division . 
As with other sections of this paper, no high degree of comprehensive-
ness is claimed here . Questions were se lected primari ly on the basis 
of their current signiflconce or their relation to fundamentals of 
institutional investment judgement. 
B. Survey 
I. New Investment Channels-- The two most outstanding depar-
tures from conventionol I ife insurance investment chonne ls in recent 
yeors have been the direct placement and equities in real estate. With 
the great rise in installment debt that has occurred during the past 
two years, the ob i igatlons of sales finance companies have a lso pro -
vided on increasingl y important outlet for I ife ins urance investment 
fun ds. To find out what other chonges were taking place, the surveyed 
companies were ask~d If they had recently invested outside convent-ional 
channels and those ment ioned above , To a certain extent, these 
quest ions were aimed at finding out how enterprising and aggressive 
the New England I ife companies are in seeking new outlets for their 
investment funds. 
Investments in transportation equipment other than that used _ 
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by rai !way, air! ine and bus companies seem to be gaining popularity with 
some I ife insurance compan ies. A good deal has been written latel y on 
institutional participation in deals to finance oi I tanker fleets whic h 
are then leased to refineries or sold to foreign shippers. When asked 
if they favor these new investment opportunities in transportation equip-
ment, five of the companies rep! ied that they do not. 
Two of the three remaining companies have made loans on tankers 
and inland waterway vessels. One has financed the construction of New 
York harbor tugs, which were subsequently leased to a railroad . This 
company has also been asked to finance the vessels which carry truck 
trailers (sometimes called 11 fishy-backs 11 because they resemble the rail-
road 11 piggy-backs, 11 or 11 roll-on, roll-off's 11 ) but to date has not 
committed itself in this area. Another says that its transportation 
equipment loans are usually made to a dummy corporation formed for this 
purpose. Depending upon the particular case, this corporat ion wi I I 
either re-loan the money or lease the equipment-- automobile fleets, 
tankers, off-shore dri I I ing equipment, etc. --to the firm desiring it. 
Another firm's non-conventional transportation investment has 
been mainly in ownership of tank cars leased to very high-credit 
borrowers. The terms of the lease make it possible for the equ ipment 
to be depreciated rapidly enough to have it completely written off quite 
some time before its actual value is zero. The arrangement thus becomes 
much I ike equipment trust financing without the trustee. 
More or less concurrent with the rise in popularity of trans-
portation equipment has been the increased interest of I ife insurance 
compani es in leases ln oi I and gas fields. The typical case might find 
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a producer in need of intermediate- or long - term capital with which to 
undertake new exploration. A venture such as this ental Is a great deal 
of risk and direct financing would not be at all appropriate for a 
fiduciary institution. In order to interest banks and I Jfe companies, 
therefore, the producer wi I I agree to give as security a lease on an 
established oi I or gas fie ld with proven reserves. The investment is 
thereby moved from the lowest to the highest side of the risk s cale, 
and offers an excel lent opportunity to the Investor. This was demon-
strated by the responses of the companies surveyed when asked if they 
had any loans of this sort on their books. Six of the eight said that 
they have at least a few, and that this has shown itself to be a 
relatively high- y ielding and trouble-free t ype of investment. 
One company makes most of its oi I and gas loans in partici -
pation with what they term "o i I banks, n that is, commercia I banks 
located in heavy bl !~producing areas, especially Texas. The bank 
g·eneral ly originates the loan, and lending is on a nbankn rather than 
11 i'nsurance11 basis, as this company spokesman put it. In other words, 
term loan s are the rule, rather than the ten to thirty year loans that 
I ife companies usually preter to deal in. Another company reported that 
they have very few oi I and gas loans, and that most of what they do have 
are pipe! ine securities featured by a "throughput" agreement wherein 
the user covenants to put at least a minimum volume t hrough in any one 
month. 
A third company stated that they have quite a few of these 
loans, a] I quite short- term and bearing "extremel y high" returns. The 
company has a first I ien on all productive equipment securing the loan, 
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together with an assignment on runs. This means that in case of default 
the I ife company is entitled to all proceeds from runs ahead of the wei 1 
operator. This company is currently doirig only a I imited amount of new 
investing in this field. They have found that commercial banks near 
the producer are now taking up most of the maturities up to seven years, 
leaving but I ittle that is attractive. 
One of the two companies replying they are not presently 
investing in oil and gas securities said that they have done so in the 
past but have had such poor experience with them that they no longer 
are interested. ThJs was about the only sour note sounded by any of 
the companies interviewed. The last company has no oi I and gas loans 
whatsoever, but nevertheless has a high regard for them. The officer 
interviewed here said that his company feels that there is a sort of 
''statutory stigma" attached to this kind of investment. He explained 
that the laws of his state used to prohibit investment in wasting 
assets, and that his company has not yet comp letel y shaken their feeling 
that this is forbidden territory. This situation points up the fact 
that the ingrained attitudes of institutional investment managers some-
times respond siDwly to a change in environment or opportunity. 
One company would go no further than to say that they might 
go out looking for new investment outlets s uch as off-shore dri I I ing 
rigs, finance companies, oi I production, and Canadian securities if 
they thought the time was ripe. Only two companies were able to 
provide a description of an investment mechanism not covered earlier, 
and this new medium was the same for both companies. As out I ined by 
one, a Canadian oi I company desirous of expanding its market ing 
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faci I ities hod been financing fi I I ing station operators through loans 
secured by mortgages on the operators' dwe I I i ngs and, in some cases, 
the fi I I ing stat ion property. In order to stream! ine the operation 
and also obtain more capita l, the oi I company approached this I ife 
insurance company. An agreement was negotiated whereby the I ife com-
pany provides a sort of revolving fund for the oi I company to draw 
on in its loans to fi I I ing station operators. The operator now gives 
his mortgage to a trustee who in turn issues certificates to the I ife 
company equal I ing t he funds taken down by the oii company . These cer-
tificates secure the I ife company through the mortgages held by the 
trustee. Diagramatical ly, the arrangement looks something I ike this: 
2. Liquidity-- The s urveyed companies were asked to state 
which portions of their portfolio they considered to be most liquid. 
The question is somewhat academic because, as has been ment ioned 
earlier, the net cash flow of alI major I ife Insurance compa nies has 
always been positive, even during the worst years of the depression. 
This unique characteristic means that under almost any conceivab le 
circumstance a given I ife company wi I I be looki'ng for new investments 
rather than trying to se II a great number of o I d on.es. Furthermore, 
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since it is institutional investors themselves who make most of the 
market tor long-term government and corporate bonds, it is I ikely 
that the market would col lapse under the demands placed upon it in 
the event of mass I iquidation. If only one or two companies were to 
attempt to unload heavily, the market might absorb their offerings, 
but the circumstances which forced them to dump would probab ly have 
the same effect on many other i nst i tut ion a I investors. 1 t was p r i-
mari ly to forestall th~ disruptive effects of mass I iquldation that 
the Federal Reserve Act was drafted to include provisions for I ite 
insurance companies and others to discount their gov.ernments at Federa I 
Reserve banks in time of need. When the officer being interviewed 
appeared skeptical about the basis in reality of a question on I iquidity, 
the hypothetical instance of the dropping of one atomic bomb in this 
country was offered. AI l-out hydrogen warfare would undoubtedly 
produce so many fatal casualties that the I ite insurance companies 
could never realize enough cash to pay alI beneficiaries, but it only 
one or two bombs were dropped before cessation of hosti I ities it seems 
probable that the government would not grant a moratorium to the I ite 
insurance industry. This example may seem I ike indulgence in a tl ight 
of fantasy, but it served its purpose in securing responses from alI 
the men interviewed except one particularly uncooperative officer whose 
laconic rep I ies contributed almost nothing to any of this section. 
Not too surprisingly, the companies alI agreed that their 
United States government bonds are their most I iquid holding, although 
only one officer seemed to be aware of the discount privilege. The 
answer was frequent I y given as "long-term governments 11 rather than 
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"short-term governments" or just ••governments .•• For the very reason 
that I ife companies are not much concerned with I iquidity needs, they 
tend to buy long-term governments rather than short maturities such as 
bills, to get the higher y ields. This, of course, is completel y in 
accordance with the long-pull nature of all I ife insurance investing. 
When asked what they_ regarded as their next most I i quid hoI d-
ings, five of the seven responding companies named Aaa corporate bonds 
in all the principal categories, i~ e ., industrial, railroad, and public 
uti I i ty. Two companies indIcated that they thought the highest degree 
of I iquidity should be found in uti I ities, while a third favored high-
grade muni c ipals. One said that short maturities in alI categories 
might wei I be sold to banks. 
Two companies gave their second choice fo r a source of I !quid 
funds as mortgages. This is not to say that a I ife insurance company 
co uld readily avai I itself of cash by peddling substantial quantities 
of mortgages. Rather, repayment of principal by mortgagors is constantly 
generating new, Invest I b I e cqsh. For this reason, I i fe compqn i es can 
and do make mortgage comm itments wei I into the future, to be s ure of 
having new outlets for funds returned via amortization. Should a I ffe 
compan y cease to make new commitments and cancel some of its old ones, 
it would not be long before a large cash backlog accumulated. This is 
what the two company spokesmen referred to above had in mind, although 
one did say that such a cou rs e co uld not be embarked upon I ightl y, 
Inasmuch as it would almost ce rtainl y mean the end of a mortgage field 
organization which takes yea rs to build up. 
3. Diversi fication-- The s urvey companies were asked which 
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kind ot diversification they weight most heavily in their investments 
geographical, by Industry, or by companies within the industry. Two 
said that approximately equal consideration was given to all three kinds. 
Each qualified t11is s l ightly, one by saying that they limit t .,e amount 
which they put into finance companies, although since they have a h i gh 
regard tor this type ot investment the limitat i on is probably a generous 
one. The other stated that in their mortgages they stress geographica I 
diversification. This company, the smallest ot those interviewed, 
went on to say that diversif i cation within the industry i s stressed 
least by small lite companies, probably because their limited portfolios 
restrict them t o a sma l I number ot corporations in most industries. 
All the rest ot the companies said in effect that they fo ll ow 
no prescribed formu la in achieving diversif icat ion. A typi ca l comment 
was, "We like to invest on a day-to-day basis at the best going price. 
Our diversi tication by and large comes about through the natural course 
ot events." Or, "There is no conscious attempt to set any pattern in 
our diversification. The company operates in so many lines that diver-
sification comes about naturally." Another officer brought up the point 
that many large borrowers have diversification themselves, at least in 
the geographical spread ot their markets, and perhaps also in product 
mix. Recent purchases ot finance company debt have been so heavy t hat 
severa l ot the companies interviewed are now curtailing in vestment in 
that field, but th i s was about the on ly kind ot industry limitation 
consisten t ly mentioned. Whereas one ot the compan i es noted above 
emphasizes geographical diversification in its mortgages, one company 
ot t he 11 no-prescri bed - tormu la 11 schoo I stated that about the only 
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catego ry where they considered geographical diversification to be 
important is in finance companies. Although taking geographical diver-
sification as it comes, one of t he companies definitely considers di-
versification by individua l borrowers; they limit themse lves to between 
one-half of 1% and 1% of total assets in any one corporation, and try 
to stay away from borrowers in cyclical industries. 
One officer contradicted himself to a certa in extent by 
saying, " We do consciously try to diversify. We would li mi t the amount 
of our investment In any corporation and also watch the amount we have 
in any one industry or locality. Diversification comes natural ly t o a 
cons iderable extent. We have, like several other life companies, eased 
off in loans t o finance companies because of heavy purchases here in 
the near past." From the general tone of t he interview It seemed some-
what doubtfu I just how much of the diversificat ion of this man's company 
was the product of a carefully prearranged formula. 
4. Capital Gains-- About the only Important profit-taking 
by insurance.cdmpa ni es in the past few decades was that which occurred 
immed iate ly after World War IJ in mu nicipa ls, when falling interest 
rates had pushed prices to great heights a nd there was strong demand 
from Individual investors In high income t ax brackets. Lif e insurance 
companies enjoy specia I tax treatment with respect to capital gains 
that exceeds even their 7.8% rate on Investment Income in liberality 
capita I gains are ta x-free to them. It mig ht be expected that this 
would act as an inducement to frequent profit taking. However, capital 
gains imply purchase In anticipation of market a ppreci ation, which has 
a distinctly speculative flavor foreign to activities of fiduciaries. 
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Witho ut exception, the companies surveyed regard capital 
gains as a secondary consideration. One company said th~ t it has only 
rarely bought to se l I, and two stated that they do take profits, but 
not for the sake of profits alone. Another company said that they 
occasionally sel I for capital gain in order to balance losses taken on 
other securities, since they don't like t o have these losses show up 
on statements. Furthermore, their awareness that a ! l things change 
in ti me leads them t o take profits from time to time so that t he re wi I I 
be no great accumulation should ca pita l gains become taxable at some 
time in the future. A fift h com pany said tha t for the most part they 
are inclined to sel I only when they t h ink a security is overvalued or 
the borrower's credit is weakening. 
Three compa ni es singled out one or two t ypes of investme nt 
in whi ch ca pital gains pl ay some pa rt in their thinking, although each 
said that in most divis ions of the portfolio profits were unimportant. 
One stated that capital gains bulk largest in their purchases of real 
estate and common stock. A second concurred on common stock and added 
convertibles. This company added that they seldom tak e capital gains, 
however, since the life insurance company mu st immediately re-invest 
the proceeds at t he g j lng market and t hus wipe out t he prof it. The 
third company said that they reckon possibl e capital gai ns i n their 
purchas&s of municipals, although this is not by any means t he foremost 
influence. In common stocks, on t he other ha nd, capital gains are their 
primary objective in t he long-term sense. 
5. Least-Cost Inves t ments -- The surveyed companies we re asked, 
"Outside o f government bonds, what type of Joan or investment do you 
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find least costly to acqui r.e and serv ice? 11 Thi s is a difficult kind of 
question to answer at a lI accurately wi t hout recourse to statistics, and 
since the responde:1ts were told not to bother combing their files for 
figures, the rep li es g iven he re aFe perhaps a littl e vague. 
Co rporate bonds in general were cons i dered to be t he least 
cost I y investment to acq uire and s e rvi ce . The ph ra se 11 in genera 111 is 
used, because the re was some disagreement a bout the expense connected 
with pr i vate pl acemen t s. One officer stated tha t his company has li ttle 
ex pens e in putting any type of bond on the books or i n servicing them , 
i ncluding private placements . Two other off icers, however, gave any 
publi c ly offered co r porate bond as the least expens ive c lass of invest-
ment, and a third in c lu ded in his re p ly that d irect placements were the 
· most expensive ope rati on in the entire bond division. For a number of 
years now , cont roversy has surrounded the matte~ of cost of direct 
placements, with majority opin ion supporting the belief t hat private 
placement o f a loan is usually more time-consuming and ex pensive. T ~ is 
has been discussed in the sect ion on private placements, where i t was 
pointed out that the slight differentia l in rates on pr i vate dea ls over 
comparable public issues is generally attributed t o th e ext ra cost of 
acqui sition and servicing Invo lved . It i s interesting, t here fore , t o 
find one investment off icer stressing that hi s company has f ound pr i vate 
placements t o be no more expensive than public i ssues . 
Jt was said by one officer that as ide from pr ivate place-
ments there is very l ittle vari ation among bonds in cost of o riginati on 
and handlin g . He stated t hat ra i I bonds are apt to yield mo re t han 
others and t hat his company has a r e latively high percen t of these, 
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a lthough this proportion has bee ,-t dropping of late . Anot her man gener-
a li zed somewhat in saying that acq uir ing a nd servicing the obli-gations 
of any wel l-known concern of good standing tends to be relatively Inex-
pensive. ]n other words, there would be comparat ively l itt le resea rch 
necessary in originating t he investment, and a strong borrower woul d not 
be apt to present problems of default and consequent supervision . 
6 . Trends of lnvest nent Preference-- An attempt was made t o 
determine whether or not rece ;l t trends in the avera I I pattern of invest-
ment preference have been reasonably unifor m among the companies sur-
veyed . Accordingly, they were asked, !!]s th e re any portion of your 
investmen t portfolio that has increased or decrea sed at a relatively 
high rate during the past fi ve yea rs or so?" The replies given show 
crosscurrents operating beneath the surface of total performance. As 
in t he previous question, extensive statistical analysis would prob-
ab ly be required to complete ly unravel the many different lines of 
approach among and wi t hin compani e s, and, in keeping with the ground 
rules laid down earlier, this type of study is not undertaken here. 
Two companies reported that their uti I i ty bond portfo I i os 
have been gaining steadily in both absolute and relative size over 
the past fi~e years. One of these said the greatest growth has been 
inuti liti es and In the "industrial and miscellaneous" division, with 
an app roximately equal rate of growth for both. A third company, 
howeve r, noted t ha t their uti 11 ty portfo I i o has remained jus t about 
exactly stable since 1950. 
Jt was expected that the companies would show general agree-
ment as to a gain in mortgage loans, but on ly three specified that their 
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mortgage portfolios have increased noticeably in t he period under 
cons id erat i on . One sa i d tha t their non-farm mo rtgages have gone f r om 
14% to 24% of total assets since 1948, and th e other two said merely 
that mortgages have "come up." 
The greatest confl ic t of opinion cente red a round indu st ri a l 
and miscellaneous loans . Three compan ies said this category ha s been 
increas ing faster than any other, and a fo urt h sa id that their in dus-
tri a l loans have risen fr-om 14% t o 24% of all assets since 1948 . On 
t ~e ot he r hand, two compan i es sa id that bonds, in c lu ding industrials, 
have been decreasing conc urrent ly with the greater emphas i s placed on 
mortgages in recent years . This is in accord with the performa nce 
record given in Chart I IJ. An off icer of one of these two compani~s 
po in ted out that the decrease in bond s may be more apparent t ha n r ea l , 
si nce part of i t i s due to depreciation in market price and book value 
caused by rising interest rates . 
Outside of ut i llti es, in dustria ls, and mort gage loans , the 
only portfolio division said by any of the companies to be r eg i ster i ng 
substant ial gains was common st ocks . One compa ny stated that in rel -
ative terms, at least, their common stock had grown at a more r ap i d 
pace than any other asset . 
Since the end of Wor ld Wa r I I most lite insurance compan i es 
have been stead il y liqui dating their holdings of l.glited States govern-
ment bonds. It was not su rprising, therefore, to find that a I I the 
companies not giving corporate bonds as the div i sion showing the great -
est loss ag r eed that governments have been the principal loser . Inte r-
est in gly eno ugh, one officer sa i d that his company ha s the la r gest 
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portfolio of gove rnments of any United States life insurance company. 
Although these governments occupy 40% of the total bond portfolio, this 
company had one of the highest net investment yield records for 1955 of 
a ny major life company. This underli nes the f act that there is no 
sing le correct met hod of operat i ng a life insurance lnvesiment depart-
ment profitably, and that there is a good deal less conformity in the 
thinking of large institutiona l investors than some believe. 
7. New England-- The question of whet ner the surveyed com-
panies have any preferences or prejudices toward New England borrowers 
was brought up in several preceed ing sections. As a final check, t his 
question was asked once more in this section on overal I investment 
policy. The results tal li ed quite we i I with the impression gaine d fr om 
· the queries in other sections. None of the compan ies were very precise 
in their answers, a nd it is a li tt le difficult to draw c lear c ut con -
clusions . Nevertheless, it appears that on net balance the companies 
may lean slightly toward New England enterprise. One company, for ex-
amp le, said t hat t hey have made investments in their home state that 
they would have never made elsewhere. 
Several companies stressed that they write business on a 
national basis and are ob liged to invest in the sa ~e way in order to be 
fair to policyholders . Generally speaking, the policy seems to be one 
o~ se lecting investments for their safety a nd return, with New England 
borrowers getting the nod at any time they can meet or better the 
competition for funds. The compa ni es which take geographical diver-
sification into account would, of course, wish to avoid an undue con-
centration of loans in any one region. Furthermo r· e, it is t he belief 
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of one of the officers intervi~wed that New England concerns vis~ vis 
the rest of the country do less outside financing, s in ce they are more 
accustomed to financing themselves internally through retained earnings, 
and also because of the Jack of growth here. 
At the sa me time, however, none of the companies in answering 
this question said that they consciously discriminate against New 
England enterprise (except perhaps the Boston area) and several indicated 
that on an-al l-ather-thi ngs-being- equal basis a New England borrower 
would be give n first choice. There were other statements made whi ch 
gave the imp ression tha t New England borrowers are a little favo~ed. 
Several companies said that especially in the case of smal I loan s a New 
England borrower wou ld be more apt to be familiar t o the life company 
and therefore require less initial investigation in the origination of 
the loan. After the loan had been made, it would be simpler becau s e of 
geographical proximity to make the periodic checks required. Thi s ease 
of origination and servicing, particularly in private placements, i s 
almost sure to favorably influence a life c ompany cons idering a New 
England firm 1s loan app licatio~. Finally, the New England li fe com-
pany is more apt to have contacts that wi I I bring i n local business. 
In the hope of gaining some insight Into t he matter of re-
gional loya lty of capital as regards life insurance compan ie s, thLs 
question was asked: 11 0o you have any idea how much capital outflow via 
your investments in other sections of the country exceeds premium inflow 
from your New England policyholders? 11 This sort of thing i s very diffi-
cult to measure at a! I accurate ly. A simple summation of a! I the com-
pany1s securities which bear the names of New England corporations does 
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not begin to tel I the story, since many firms ou tsi de the region have 
branches or do business here . Some sor t of an arbitrary allocation of 
the interest o u ~side firms have in New En g la nd i s required, and esti-
mates of this sort are a lmost sure to contain a good dea l of guesswork . 
Jt was only to be expected, then, that the response s to t ;, is 
qu estion were almost entirely a simple nNo.n One company had done a 
study relat ing to t his question a number of years ago but had no record 
of it when interviewed. On ly one company in th e ei ght was able to give 
figures. Their study covered the years 1947 and ~948, and included only 
Massach uset ts I i fe insurance compan i es, as to I lows (mi IIi ons of 
dollars): 
Salaries and other compensation pa i d to Mass. residents 
Jn c rease in net investments in Mass. 
Benefi t s paid to Mass. pol i cyho lders 
Total payout in Mass .• 
Premium receipts from Mass. 
Net positive payout to Mass .. 
$ 46.6 
11 2 . 9 
88 . 9 
$2 48.4 
.$ 166 . 3 
$ 82 . I 
No conclusive judgement ca n be derived from a single isolated 
study such as this, but certain ly these figures show that Massachusetts 
benef itted con s iderably from the act iv it i es of its l i fe insura nce com-
panies in 1947 and 1948 . 
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VJ I. CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to cover several areas in the invest-
ment policies of New England lite insurance companies, and h ~ s touched 
upon a great many individual topics within these areas. For this reason, 
it is somewhat difficult to summarize broadly or to draw specific con-
clusions from the material presented. In terms of current significanc e, 
probably direct placements and real estate equities demand the greatest 
amount of creative thinking by investment officers and produce most of 
the really new ideas in the field of life insurance investments. It may 
be worthwhile, therefore, to gat~er together here some of the general 
impressions formed in these areas during the course of the interviews. 
Jn the present economic environment of ful I employment and 
record levels of personal and cor porate income there are relatively f ew 
soft spots. One that does ex ist, and which has been the subject of a 
good deal of political and financial debate is the problem of the smal I 
businessman in securing the long-term capital he needs to compete 
effectively with the larger concerns. Government -sponsored steps are 
being taken to ease this burden, notably in proposals to increase the 
powers of the Smal I Business Administration. At the same time, private 
enterprise through the medium of the life insurance companies has made 
even greater progress in making funds avai !able to smaller businesses 
through private placements. 
Private placements can be expected to continue to provide an 
impor-tant source of funds to smaller corporations for a number of reasons. 
Because the life Insuran ce company can provide the entire amount of the 
loan in a private deal, it becomes economically sound for the lender to 
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spend the necessary time in investigating the history and financial 
strength of the borrower. The borrower is relieved of much of the ex-
pense of a public issue, and has a much better opportunity to fit the 
terms of his Joan to his actual needs. This same ability to tal lor the 
terms of a private placeme nt to its own requirements is of correspond-
Ingly great val~e to the life insurance company. Most of the loans 
to small borrowers which have been made by direct placenent would never 
have come about had the life company been forced to accept the terms 
of a typical public issue, rather than being able to incorporate the 
protective provisions which suited it best. The advantages accruing 
to the smal I borrower do not end at the time the direct placement is 
consummated. Throughout the life of the loan, he wi II be able to turn 
to the life company for sound advice on the conduct of his financial 
affairs. Should he embark upon a n economically unsound venture, his 
poor judgement wi I I probably be bought to his attention before Irrep-
arable harm is done. Finally, having established himself with his life 
company as a good credit, the small businessman wi II undoubtedly be 
able to satisfy immediately any future needs for new long-term funds 
which may arise. The life insurance company wi II have become a depend-
ab 1 e 11 I ong-term banker. 11 
The unique characteristics of the private placement have also 
been of aid to the large indu strial corporations. Record expansion 
effort of the country's giant enterprises, notably the steel and dur-
able goods producers, has exerted an immense strain upon the money 
markets and has placed long-term funds at a premium. jn encouraging 
the public to save more through growing purchases of life insurance 
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life companies are helping to hold down current consumption and provide 
funds for the bui !ding of capital goods that is s o necessary for econom-
ic growth. Because the direct placeme nt enab les them to fo rmu late Joan 
agreements which offer maximum protection to t he lender, life insurance 
compan i es have undoubted ly been more wi !ling to make loans to cyclical 
industries such as those men tioned above than they were twenty or thirty 
years ago. No longer do t hey feel obliged to c hannel the bulk of their 
new inve~tment funds into government bonds, municipals and uti I iti es . 
In · Jo~ns to both large and smal I borrowers, the private p lace-
ment offers a degree of flexibl lity almost never found In public is s ues. 
The borrower deals with only one or a few lenders on a more or less 
personal basis, rather than having the loan held by thousands of security 
• 
buyers whose only interest in the corporation is the uninterrupted flow 
of interest payments. Thus, if the corporation runs Into heavy weather, 
It can deal face · to face with the lender and may expect r econsideration 
of the loan covenants where t 11 is wi I I help to insure a going concern. 
Should there be a general economic readjustment a nd a serious recession 
this flexibility wl I I do much to avoid the mass foreclosures and con-
sequent bankruptcies which have followed depressions In the past. 
The trend toward real estate ownership by lif e in~urance com-
panies is para! lei in some respects to the growth of direct p lacements . 
In both cases the life compa nies have departed from established practices 
in fiduciary investment in order t o gain new ou tlets and higher returns. 
Thi s has benefitted not only t he borrower but the public as wei I, since 
the added income has enabled life insurance companies to offer more 
protection per dol Jar of premium In the contracts they write. With the 
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legal restrictions t hat surround their investment activities life 
insurance companies in the past have had little opportunity to acquire 
assets wh i ch would offer some offset to inflation, i. e., they have 
been restricted primarily to fixed-income securities. Real estate 
equities should help materially in providing life companies wi th a 
hedge against inflation. The value of land and bui !dings does not 
rise_ and tal I exactly with movements of the Consumer Price Index but 
is much more apt to to I low the upward path of i nf I at ion than is the 
value of bonds and mortgages. 
Coming more specifically to the compan ies surveyed in this 
study, it may be said that t i1 e inves t ment policies of New England life 
insurance companies present a picture of both conformance to accepted 
norms and considerable individualism. Certa inly no two companies think 
exact ly alike in any one area of portfolio management. Ma ny wr iters, 
in discussing life insurance investments , tend t o creat e the i I lusi on 
' 
that the companies may a l I be grouped in one co llective unit so far as 
their approach to in vesting technique i s conce rned. Thi s Implies that 
Ji fe insurance compani es , because of their common fun ct ion, think and 
act as one. 
It is true that a good many operations in thhs field are 
ffr irly wei I standard i zed among life insurance compan i es, but their re-
actions to new developments in the market and in the economy as a whole 
are shaped by ind ividu a l personnel within each investment department, 
and as such are not at a! I standardized. The recent increase in the 
demand for funds by finance companies, fo r example, has been met with 
a lacri ty by some of the companies surveyed. Others have made loan s of 
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this type with considerable caution. And one company does not have a 
single finance company obligation on its books, simply because its 
investment committee is composed largely of old-line New En g landers 
with a high regard for thrift and the ability t o live within one's 
income. These men do not wish to be a pa rt of supporting the growth 
of installment debt. 
1 t may be worthwh i I e to review s ome of the othe r I ead i ng 
differences of investment opinion brought to light during the survey 
since they serve to emphasize t ;1at institutional investment policies 
are the product of individual judgements. In the field of private 
placements, the companies did not agree as to whether or not the differ-
ential in rates over a comparable public issue tends to be fairly con-
stant, or as to the amount of this differential. One company, in tact, 
-stated that they found direct placements to be less expensive to ac-
quire than public issues. In the matter of requesting common stock 
options or convertible notes only two companies were wholeheartedly . 
enthusiastic, altho ugh the other companies seemed generally willing to 
accept such options when they were included in a deal originated by 
another lite company. 
In real estate ownership properties leased to national ~etai I 
chains are generally conceded to be the soundest sort of investment by 
writers on this subject. Nevertheless, two of the companies inteFviewed 
expressed a disinclination toward this kind of real estate. And on a 
very basic question -- whet her the intrinsic value of the property or 
the credit of the tenant is the most important criterion of value--
the companies surveyed were split almost equally in their judgement . 
• 
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Perhaps the best indication of variance among the companies 
surveyed in portfolio performance is given in Section VJ-6. There it 
Is shown that whereas Chart I II shows a growth in mortgages and a decline 
in bond holdings in recent years, only three of the companies surveyed 
fell into this pattern. Furthermore, three companies stated that their 
holdings of Industrial and miscellaneous bonds have been growing faster 
than any other type of asset. 
Numerous other instances of variations in the investment 
practices of the companies surveyed could be cited. On the other hand, 
the surveyed companies are a good deal alike in one respect their 
conservative attitude toward the newer channels of investment. With 
very few exceptions the officers and analysts interviewed displayed only 
superficial knowledge of and interest in the variable annuity. The com-
panies for the most part have as yet formulated no official policy on 
variable annuities, nor are they at alI sure whether or not they would 
institute a variable annuity plan of their own if enabling legislation 
were passed. 
When the question 11 Are there any channels of investment not 
already discussed that you have found to be worthwhile or that you are 
contemp lat ing experi~enting with? 11 was asked, responses were either 
lukewarm or negative. These indicatibns of conservatism do not nec-
essari ly cal I for criticism. The New England companies have shown 
themselves to be fully capable of meet i ng the need for new investment 
outlets through their activities in the direct placement and real 
estate fields. The fiduciary aspect of life insurance Investing 
demands a cautious approach to untried investment media, and the in surance 
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company which fai Js to observe this caution may suffer a fate simi Jar 
to that of many of the Texas companies. 
On net balance, the impression given during this study by the 
companies surveyed was one of highly enlightened and effective investment 
poI icy. These companies number among the foremost Ln the country, and 
there is no reason to expect that their position wi II be anything but 
stronger in the years to come. 
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APPEND IX 
QUE ST JON SHEET 
I. Direct Placements 
I. Do you often engage i n forward commi t ments for future f i-
nanci ng whereby th e borrower can draw down funds at a fixed and pr e -
vious ly- ag r eed -u pon rate of interest ? 
2 . Have you acqu ired any common or preferred stock via the 
direct p lacement route? Do you think i t works as wei i i n th is instance 
as wi th fixed ob li gat ion s ? 
3. Do yo u find it more exped i t i ous to dea l wi th N.E. enter -
prises in direct placements than wit h concerns from other parts of the 
coun try? 
4. Have you had any troub le disposing of securities acquired 
by d i rect p I acement? 
5. Do you find there i s a f a irly constant d if fere nti a l be-
tween the rate o f return you get on private dea ls and what you would 
ex pect to get on the same securi t y (and same company) if purchased on 
the open market? What i s t he amount of this d if fe r entia l? 
6. Is the in itiati ve In t hese dea ls ty pi cal ly wdh yo ur com-
pany or with t he borrower? How does the borrower usually approac h you, 
i . e ., th r ough a broker, di rect ly , etc.? 
7. Has it been your experience that the direct place ;~nt 
route has made it more feasible for yo u to lend to sma l I borrowers tha n 
would be th e case were you restr ict ed to purchase of the i r ob li gations 
in the open market? 
8. Under what c ircumst ances do yo u or would you cons i der co-
operating wit h othe r firiancial Inst itut ions (other li fe compa ni es and/ 
or banks, etc .) In a privat e dea l? 
9 . What protective provis ions do you generally In s i st upon 
In yo ur privately p laced In dent ures? 
10. Wou ld you say that on the average private placements re-
quired more or less analyt ica l work by your staff than pub l ic i ssues? 
I I. Do you ever engage in sa les of pr i vate ly- p lace d secur ities 
to or from other li fe insurance companies? 
12 . Do money ma rket conditions seem to directly af f ect your 
operat ions in pr i vate placemen t s? How? What a bout present cond i t ions? 
13. Do you ever request warrants for common stock o r convert -
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ible securities in your direct placements? Would you generally ex pect 
to exercise these or to cash them? 
II. Publicly Issued Bonds 
Industria Is: 
I. What percent of these bonds have you bought by direct 
· placement during the past five years? 
2. Do you tend to give preference to obligations of New 
En g land enterprises? 
3. Does the bulk of your present portfolio consist of un-
secured obi igations ? 
Obligations of State and Local Governments: 
I. What percent o f these bonds have you bought by direct 
placement during the past five years? 
2. Do you tend t o give preference to state and muni c ipal 
obligati ons from the New En g land area? 
3. Jn your investment experience with full faith a nd credit 
obligations vs. revenue bonds, do you find that either type offers 
es pee i a I I y noteworthy advantages? Disadvantages? 
4. Do you find that with their low yields, due to tax-exempt 
status, state and municipal bonds a re largely unattractive? 
Rai !road and Public Utility Bonds: 
I. What percent of these bonds have you bought by direct 
pl acemen t in each of the las t five years? 
J I] . Rea I Estate Ownership 
I . What type of rea I estate are you investing in most heav i I y 
at present (e.g., housing developments, retai I store (chains), o ffice 
bui !dings, etc.)? What do you consider to be the advantages of this 
type? Th e disadvantages? 
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2 . Have you tried the "san dwic h" lease? 1'-/ith what success? 
3 . Jn non-residential real estate, do you a lways insi s t upon 
abso lute ly net r en t a ls, o r do you saneti mes agree to bear part of the 
taxes and cost of ope rating th e property? 
4. On what bas i s do you genera I I y amortize property? 
5~ Do you ever invest i n rea l estate without first securing 
a commi t men t from a future t enant t o occupy the property? 
6 . Do you genera lly purchase your real estate from its 
present ow ner o r do you often finance the original constr~ction ? 
7. Do you ever i nvest in un improved land ? ~nder what con-
ditions? 
8. What problems do you find in the ownership of Boston real 
estate? 
9 . Do you t end to favor the N.E. area in your real estate 
investments? 
10 . What type of r esidenti a l housing do you prefer for invest-
ment purposes ? Why ? 
I I. How does the average return from your rea l estate holding s 
compare wit h that from other investments? 
12 . \tJ hat type( s) of comme rcia I prope rties do you pr e fer? 
Do you prefer commercial property t o that used for ma nufact ur i ng? 
Why ? 
Why ? 
13. Which do you conside r more impo rtant - th e credit sta nd in g 
of the tena nt or th e intr insi c value of t he propert y? 
14 . Do your leas es genera I Jy contain renewa I options? WLth 
what provi sions ? 
15. Do your leases generally contai n rep urc hase options? With 
what provisions? 
16 . Do you ever purchase singl e unit s of residential or com-
mercial rea l estate? Of what type, and und er what con d itions? 
17. Through wh at channe Is do you typically acq uire (equity 
investments in) rea I estate, i. e . , through your own staff or throug h 
intermedia ries ? 
18. Un de r what c ircumsta nces do you find out rig ht ownersh ip 
of property ~ore desirable than si mp le taking a mortgage? 
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J V. Mortgages 
1 . Do you secure most of your mortgages through the efforts 
of your own staff, or do yo u typically use mortgage brokers and corre-
spondents? What type of broker or correspondent arrangements do you 
prefer? 
2 . Do you do any substantial investing in farm mortgages? 
Why (not)? 
3. What type(s) of non-term mortgage is the most practical 
for your company, i. e., yields the highest net return? 
4. Do you experience difficulty in placing residential mort-
gages in N.E. due to the concentration of mortgage money here, espe-
cia lly in the hands of mutual savings banks? 
5. What geographical area seems to you most favorable for 
residential mortgages? 
6. Under what condit ions would you prefer to take a mortgage 
on property rather than owning it outright? 
V. Variable Annuities 
I. What do you think of the argument that life insurance com-
panies, if their permitted investment in common stocks were broadened, 
might acquire too much operating control over U.S. enterprises? 
2 . Do you consider that variable annuities would be directly 
in competition with mutual funds? 
3. With interest rates such as they presently are, and stock 
prices at their current high levels, do you think now is as good a time 
to institute a variable annuity plan as is apt to be found in t he near 
fwture? 
4. Do you think a variable annuity contract should properly 
have no cash or loan values, and no option tor taking cash when the 
payout period begins? J . e., should the annuitant be" locked in" both 
during the accumulation and payout periods in order that the contract 
live up to it s name of variable annuity? 
5. Do you believe that a life Insurance company should set up 
a wholly-owned, separate subsidiary to administer its variable annuities? 
6. Would you favor investing part of the reserves for vari -
able annuities in low-yielding growth stocks? Approximately how large 
a part? 
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7. Do you see any Feason why the company selling the variable 
annuity should not be subject to taxat i on on dividends and cap ital 
gains from the variable annuity reserves on an eq ua l basis with mutual 
funds? 
8. If enab lin g legis lation were to be passed, would your com-
pany favor instituting a variable annuity plan? 
VI. Miscellaneous 
I. Do you favor investments other than equipment trust certif-
i cates in transportation equipment? 
2 . Do you have any loans secured by leases in oi I and gas 
fields? How do you feel about this area? 
3 . Are there any channels of investment not mentioned above 
(sections J through V and questions I and 2 ) that you have found to be 
worthwhile or are contemplating experiment in g with? 
4 . In your avera I I investment po I icy, do you attempt to give 
preference to N.E . enterprises? 
5. Do you have any idea how much premium inflow from N.E . 
policyholder~ is exceeded by capita l out flow via investments in other 
sections of the country? 
6 . In the event of a ~udden need tor cash, what part of your 
portfolio wou ld you be most apt to liquidate first? Outside of cash 
and U. S. government ho ldings, what portion of your portfo l io do you 
consider most liqui d? 
7. Wh ich type of divers ifi cation do you we ig ht most heavily-
geographica l, by industry, or by compan ies within the industry? Does 
th i s vary sign i ficant ly wit h the type of asset involved? 
8 . How important i s the realization of capital gains in your 
avera I I portfolio management? 
9 . Outside of government bonds, what type of loan or invest-
ment do you find least costly to acq uire and service? 
10. Is there any one por tion of your investment portfolio that 
has increased (decreased) at an unusually high rate L·n the last five 
yea rs? 
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